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ABSTRACT 
With the recent discovery of crude oil reserves along the Albertine Rift, Uganda is set to establish itself as 
an oil producer in the coming decade. Total oil reserves are believed to be two billion barrels, with 
recoverable reserves estimated at 0.8–1.2 billion barrels. At peak production, likely to be reached by 
2017, oil output will range from 120,000 to 210,000 barrels per day, with a production period spanning up 
to 30 years. Depending on the exact production levels, the extraction period, the future oil price, and 
revenue sharing agreements with oil producers, the Ugandan government is set to earn revenue equal to 
10–15 percent of GDP at peak production. The discovery of crude oil therefore has the potential to 
provide significant stimulus to the Ugandan economy and address its development objectives. However, 
this is subject to careful management of oil revenues to avoid the potential pitfall of a sudden influx of 
foreign exchange. Dominating the concerns is the potential appreciation in the real exchange rate and 
subsequent loss of competitiveness in the nonresource tradable goods sectors such as agriculture or 
manufacturing (Dutch Disease). These sectors are often major employers in developing countries and the 
engines of growth. Several mitigation measures can be employed by government to counter Dutch 
Disease, including measures that directly counter the real exchange rate appreciation or measures that 
offer direct support to traditional export sectors in the form of subsidies.  
With the aid of a recursive-dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model this study 
evaluates the economic implications of the future oil boom in Uganda. We also consider various options 
open to the Ugandan government for saving, spending, or investing forecasted oil revenues with the aim 
of promoting economic development and reducing poverty, but also countering possible Dutch Disease 
effects. We find that generally urban sectors and households will be better able to capture rents generated 
by the oil revenues leading to growing rural–urban and regional inequality.  
Yet, despite these potential risks, Uganda’s oil economy presents an unparalleled opportunity for 
the agricultural sector and for poverty reduction in particular. On the one hand, domestic demand for 
food, such as cereals, root crops, pulses, and matooke (cooking banana), but especially higher valued 
products, such as horticulture and livestock products, will increase as incomes rise. Moreover, higher 
urban income and urban consumer preferences will lead to increasing demand for processed foods and 
foods with greater domestic value-added, such as meat, fish, and so on. Provided Uganda’s tradable food 
sectors can remain competitive, this provides an opportunity for both farming and the food-processing 
manufacturing sector. On the other hand, there is the immediate danger of losing market shares in 
agricultural export markets, which might be extremely hard to regain after the oil boom. As shown in this 
paper, the outcomes for agriculture, rural–urban income differentials and poverty reduction depend very 
much on whether government revenues for public investment in the agricultural sector will increase and 
help alleviate chronic underinvestment in public goods that is constraining agricultural growth in Uganda. 
Keywords:  Uganda, crude oil, Dutch Disease, agricultural competitiveness, general equilibrium 
modeling 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
With the recent discovery of crude oil reserves along the Albertine Rift, Uganda is set to establish 
itself as an oil producer in the coming decade. Total oil reserves are believed to be two billion barrels, 
with recoverable reserves estimated at 0.8–1.2 billion barrels. This is comparable to the level of oil 
reserves in African countries such as Chad (0.9 billion barrels), Republic of the Congo (1.9 billion 
barrels), and Equatorial Guinea (1.7 billion barrels) (World Bank 2010) but far short of Angola (13.5 
billion) and Nigeria (36.2 billion) (World Bank 2010). Using a reserve scenario of 800 million barrels, 
peak production, likely to be reached by 2017, is estimated by the World Bank to range from 120,000 
to 140,000 barrels per day, with a production period spanning 30 years. A more optimistic scenario in 
this study is based on 1.2 billion barrels and sets peak production at 210,000 barrels per day (see 
Appendix for details). Although final stipulations of the revenue sharing agreements with oil 
producers are not yet known, government revenue from oil will be substantial. One estimate, based on 
an average oil price of US $75 per barrel, puts revenues at approximately 10–15 percent of GDP at 
peak production (World Bank 2010) (note all $ prices quoted in the paper are in US $ terms). The 
discovery of crude oil therefore has the potential to provide significant stimulus to the Ugandan 
economy and to enable it to better address its development objectives, provided oil revenues are 
managed in an appropriate manner.  
Prior to the discovery of oil the Ugandan economy performed well, growing at over 5 percent 
per year since 2000. However, this growth was driven largely by nonagricultural growth. Agricultural 
growth was slow (around 2 percent per year), erratic, and driven largely by land expansion as opposed 
to yield improvements (Benin et al. 2008). As a result of this unequal development, rural poverty, at 
34.3 percent, remains high relative to the urban poverty rate of 13.8 percent. In addition to this, 
Uganda’s population growth rate, which averaged 3.4 percent per year between 1992 and 2002, is one 
of the highest in the world (Klasen 2004). Although this rate is predicted to decline systematically 
over the next three decades to reach about 2 percent per year by 2050, it still implies a population of 
almost 100 million by the time oil reserves run out in 2046. This is three times the size of the 
population today. The challenge is, therefore, to use oil revenue in a manner that would not only 
reduce existing poverty and rural–urban inequities, but also ensure lasting gains of oil revenues in the 
face of a rapidly growing population.  
If the experience of other resource-abundant countries is anything to go by, the prospects are 
alarming. Cross-country evidence suggests that resource-abundant countries lag behind comparable 
countries in terms of real GDP growth (Sachs and Warner 1995, 2001; Gelb 1988; IMF 2003); that 
the negative relationship between resource abundance and economic growth is stronger for oil, 
minerals, and other point-source resources than for agriculture; and that this relationship is 
remarkably robust (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003; Stevens 2003). Nonetheless, several 
countries have managed to avoid this so-called resource curse. Indonesia’s economy grew by an 
average of 4 percent per year during 1965–90, while oil and gas exports rose quickly in the 1970s, 
reaching 50 percent of exports in the early 1980s (Bevan, Collier, and Gunning 1999). Botswana 
achieved double-digit growth in the 1970s and 1980s despite rapidly growing diamond exports since 
the 1970s, and this development occurred despite the enclave character of the mineral industry (that 
is, low backward and forward linkages to other sectors) (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2003). 
Other resource-rich countries, such as Malaysia, Australia, and Norway, have successfully diversified 
their production structures, laying the ground for broad-based balanced growth. 
The anxiety about the effects of resource booms partly reflects reservations about the 
absorptive and managerial capacity of public sectors—particularly in developing countries—to 
manage large-scale investment programs or to rapidly step up service delivery without a loss in 
quality. In part, it also reflects even deeper reservations about resource dependency and the impact of 
windfall profits on the domestic political economy (Ross 2001; Leite and Weidmann 1999; Easterly 
2001). However, more traditional concerns about the macroeconomics of resource booms also figure 
large, and these are the focus in this study. Dominating these concerns is the fear that the additional 
foreign exchange arising from the exploitation and exportation of natural resources may cause an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. Although a strong domestic currency is good news for 
importers, Rodrik (2003) warns of the danger an uncompetitive real exchange rate holds for overall 
economic growth and development. The subsequent loss of competitiveness in the nonresource 
tradable goods sectors—or Dutch Disease—may hamper growth in traditional export sectors such as 
manufacturing or agriculture. These sectors are often major employers in developing countries and 
serve as the engines of growth. Of course, exportation of natural resources does not inevitably have  
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negative consequences for the economy; for example, if the resource flow emanating from the newly 
exploited natural resource is small relative to overall trade flows, or there are underemployed factors 
of production that can be used in the expanding natural resource exploitation sectors with little 
opportunity cost, or both, an expansion in natural resource exports will not necessarily lead to Dutch 
Disease (see Hausmann and Rigobon 2002; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003).  
In instances where Dutch Disease poses a real threat, two different types of measures can be 
adopted to counter its negative effects. The first set of measures aims to sterilize the exchange rate 
effect by reducing the net foreign exchange inflow. This could be achieved by stimulating demand for 
imports through, for example, the lifting of import tariffs. Alternatively, oil revenue can be transferred 
back to citizens, with the resulting increase in household disposable income raising demand for 
imports. This effect will be stronger when the import propensity of marginal consumption is high, as 
is often the case in African countries. Another option is to change the composition of public spending 
such that the import content thereof increases. For example, public infrastructure projects typically 
have higher import intensities than recurrent government expenditures on salaries, health, or 
education. Thus, by spending relatively more of the oil revenues on infrastructure, the real exchange 
rate appreciation can be countered. Lastly, a real exchange rate appreciation may be mitigated by 
accumulating foreign reserves or by investing abroad rather than domestically. Typically this involves 
setting up foreign oil funds (for example, a stabilization fund [SF] or a permanent income fund [PIF]), 
which allow better control over export revenue flows back into the domestic economy. These types of 
funds are explained in more detail in the following section.  
A second set of measures directly supports growth, productivity, or employment in traditional 
export sectors such as manufacturing or agriculture whose competitiveness is harmed by the 
appreciating real exchange rate. Short-term measures may include the introduction of production 
subsidies (for example, wage subsidies, direct production price subsidies, or input cost subsidies) that 
raise firms’ competitiveness in international markets, thus allowing them to maintain at least some of 
their market share despite the real exchange rate appreciation. Those exporters that use imported 
intermediate inputs may already benefit from cheaper inputs; hence, production subsidies may need to 
be targeted carefully to those sectors that rely on local inputs. Trade policy reforms could also benefit 
exporters; for example, by lifting export tariffs (or providing export subsidies), exporters will receive 
a higher domestic price for their goods, thus lessening the disincentive to export. Similarly, a removal 
of import tariffs by a country’s trading partners will raise demand for its exports. A more sustainable 
option—and certainly one of the central topics of discussion in the debate around how to spend oil 
revenues in Uganda (see Uganda, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development 2008)—is to invest in 
public infrastructure that ultimately raises productivity, lowers production or transport costs, and 
promotes the adoption of productivity-enhancing technologies in traditional export sectors.  
This study considers the impact of crude oil extraction and exportation on the Ugandan 
economy with a specific focus on how it might affect the agricultural sector. We also consider various 
options open to the Ugandan government for saving, spending, or investing forecasted oil revenues 
over the coming three decades. For this analysis we modify a recursive-dynamic computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model of Uganda by including crude oil extraction and refining industries. These 
industries are allowed to grow and shrink over time in line with the forecasted oil production trend 
(see Figure 2.1), while oil revenues accruing to government are either saved abroad in an oil fund (this 
sterilizes the exchange rate effect) or spent domestically. Several spending scenarios consider the 
effects of using the balance of oil funds (that is, after deducting amounts saved) to develop public 
infrastructure. Here we consider scenarios where infrastructure investments only contribute to long-
term growth through raising productive capacity, or where they also have productivity spillover 
effects in targeted sectors (for example, in agricultural or nonagricultural sectors specifically). 
Scenarios where oil revenues are distributed to citizens in the form of household welfare transfers or 
used to subsidize prices (for example, fuel subsidies) are also modeled.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 extends the introductory discussions above by 
providing further background information on forecasted oil revenues in Uganda and options for 
spending these revenues. Particular attention is given to infrastructural investments and their effects in 
developing countries, as well as the current infrastructure needs in Uganda. Section 3 discusses the 
CGE model, data, and simulation setup and design, while Section 4 presents and discusses the model 
results. Section 5 draws conclusions. A technical appendix provides detail about oil revenue forecasts 
underlying the future scenarios modeled. We also explain the modifications made to the social 
accounting matrix (SAM—the database for the CGE model), which were necessary in order to 
introduce an oil sector that does not exist at present.  
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2.  INVESTING OIL REVENUES: OPTIONS, NEEDS, AND CHALLENGES 
Oil Revenue Forecasts and Revenue Stabilization Options 
For the past two decades Uganda has managed its public finances and the macroeconomy in a prudent 
manner, yet the prospect of a large influx of oil revenue presents a major challenge to government. 
Even though Uganda’s oil reserves are not massive compared to those of the major oil producers of 
the world, the expected revenue is still substantial relative to the current size of the economy. Total 
revenues from crude oil exports depend on both the quantity sold and the world oil price. For 
example, in Uganda, at an optimistic peak production level of 180,000 barrels per day and an oil price 
of $75 per barrel, revenues are likely to exceed USh8,000 billion per year or more than $4.5 billion at 
the current exchange rate (see Figure 2.1 and Table A.1). The period for which peak production is 
sustained will depend on the estimated size of the oil reserves. The Ugandan government’s share of 
this revenue will in turn be determined by the stipulations in the Production Sharing Agreements with 
exploration companies that are currently being negotiated. Indications are that the government may 
extract anywhere between 45 and 70 percent of gross revenues, a percentage that is likely to change 
over time as production and profit levels vary (World Bank 2010). In addition, the Ugandan 
government may raise taxes on any profits generated by oil extraction companies. The revenue 
estimate in Figure 2.1 includes both the oil revenue share and tax revenue. At peak production 
government can expect to earn about USh6,000 billion (or approximately $3.2 billion) per year. By 
way of comparison, government revenue in 2008 was $2.6 billion and GDP was $14.4 billion, which 
means government revenue could more than double in 2017.  
Figure 2.1—Projected oil revenues and government revenues, 2010–40 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on production and revenue forecasts given in Table A.1 and an exchange rate of 1,723 
USh/$. 
There are at least three dimensions to the oil revenue spending challenge that lies ahead: First, 
there is the issue of how to manage oil price volatility. Volatile prices imply volatile revenue flows 
from one year to the next, which makes long-term planning difficult. Second, while increased 
administrative capacity will be required to manage a much larger infrastructural and social spending 
budget, the danger exists that government becomes too large and undisciplined in its spending. If 
service delivery becomes inefficient and administrative expenditures (for example, on salaries) grow 
too much there will ultimately be less funding available for all-important infrastructural spending. 
Third, infrastructural spending itself may be inefficient due to a lack of administrative or absorptive 
capacity within government. While spending will contribute to GDP in the current period, thus 
creating the perception of growth, it may not translate into increased production capacity and higher 
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One way to deal with revenue volatility and concerns about spending inefficiency is to 
transfer oil revenues into a foreign “oil fund” from which a smaller or a more stable revenue flow is 
extracted. The first option is to set up a budget stabilization fund (SF), which involves allocating a 
certain share of government oil revenues to a fund that can be tapped when low oil prices cause 
revenues to drop below projected flows. Examples include the SF of the Russian Federation or the 
State Oil Fund in Azerbaijan. When using an SF government may still plan to spend all oil revenues 
during the oil extraction period, in which case the SF is only used to smooth the revenue flow as it 
deviates from projected revenues. However, such a fund could also be used to extend the spending 
period beyond the oil extraction period by saving a greater share of annual revenue and continuing to 
draw on accrued savings that remain at the end of the oil extraction period. A second option is a 
permanent income fund (PIF) or heritage fund. Here all revenue from oil is transferred to the fund and 
only the interest earned on accumulated funds is allocated to the government budget. The Norwegian 
Government Pension Fund and the Kuwaiti Future Generations Fund are good examples of such PIFs. 
A PIF provides a much smaller flow of revenue compared to the default option of spending all 
revenues immediately, but the income stream is perpetual, thus having the potential of benefiting 
future generations. The revenue stream is also likely to be fairly stable or predictable, especially when 
long-term fixed interest rates are earned on the accumulated funds. 
Although the development challenges loom large in Uganda, a prudent spending approach is 
desirable. This means not succumbing to the temptation of spending too much too soon. Proponents of 
a spend-all approach may appeal more to the masses, with arguments that the country cannot afford to 
hoard revenue amidst crumbling infrastructure and developmental backlogs. However, ideally 
speaking, spending levels should only gradually increase in line with the pace at which government 
capacity grows. Uganda has taken advice of this nature on board in announcing that an oil fund will 
indeed be set up and managed by the Central Bank (see Uganda, Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Development 2008, 51). The way in which the fund is managed (that is, how funds are deposited or 
withdrawn over time) should be explicitly governed by the legal and regulatory framework for oil 
revenue. Such a framework, combined with a gradually enhanced institutional capacity, should 
cushion the country from pressure from those who would want to see quick but unsustainable gains 
from oil. 
Investment Spending Options 
Investment for Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction 
The pace at which public infrastructure is developed is an important determinant of the development 
process. Numerous studies highlight the importance of the stock of public infrastructure as one 
necessary ingredient for agricultural productivity growth (Binswanger, Khandker, and Rosenzweig 
1993; Ram 1996; Esfahani and Ramirez 2002). Hulten (1996) argues it is not only the level of public 
investment that matters, but also the spending efficiency and the effectiveness with which existing 
capital stocks are used by citizens (see also Calderón and Servén 2005, 2008; Reinikka and Svensson 
2002). Microeconomic studies tend to focus more on the latter aspect, and show that improved access 
to public infrastructure positively influences the adoption of productivity-enhancing technologies by 
farm households or firms (Antle 1984; Ahmed and Hossain 1990; Renkow, Hallstroma, and Karanjab 
2004). Access to and utilization of public infrastructure also has important welfare effects, including 
the reduction of rural poverty (Fan, Hazell, and Thorat 2000; Fan and Zhang 2008; Gibson and 
Rozelle 2003) and rural inequality (Calderón and Servén 2005; Fan, Zhang, and Zhang 2003). The 
strength of these welfare effects, however, depends on the institutional setup in countries (Duflo and 
Pande 2007), while strong complementarities exist between physical and human capital (Canning and 
Bennathan 1999). The latter suggests that investments in education, training, or rural extension 
services would enhance the effectiveness of infrastructural investments. 
The overwhelming message is that infrastructural investments matter for development, 
especially when measures are in place to improve access to that infrastructure. However, it is less 
clear precisely where to invest in order to maximize growth and poverty outcomes. The agricultural 
sector stands out as a strong candidate. Agriculture is an important sector in many developing 
countries in terms of its share of national GDP and employment. Agricultural growth is therefore  
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particularly important in determining the pace of poverty reduction (Diao, Hazell, and Thurlow 2010; 
Valdés and Foster 2010). In Uganda the agricultural sector is relatively small, contributing less than 
one-third to national GDP. However, it remains a significant employer, with 81 percent of the 
population living in households that are directly involved in agricultural activities (see Benin et al. 
2008). Farming is by no means exclusively a rural activity in Uganda (27.8 percent of urban 
households are engaged in agricultural activities), but it is clear from population statistics that a focus 
on rural agriculture is warranted: 9 in 10 farm households live in rural areas, and one in three rural 
inhabitants are poor, compared to 13.8 percent of urban people. This implies that growth in the 
agricultural sector has the potential to significantly reduce poverty in Uganda. Weak historical 
agricultural growth, low agricultural yields, and poor infrastructure in Uganda all point to the great 
potential for this sector to grow rapidly should significant public investments, particularly in 
infrastructure, reach this sector. 
Using a recursive-dynamic CGE model, Benin et al. (2008) are able to demonstrate how rapid 
agricultural growth achieved through yield improvements under the Comprehensive African 
Agricultural Development Plan (CAADP) in Uganda contributes to overall growth and poverty 
reduction. CAADP aims to achieve 6 percent agricultural growth by committing countries to allocate 
10 percent of their overall budgets to the agricultural sector in the form of infrastructure investments, 
research and development, and extension services. In Uganda the 6 percent growth target implies a 
doubling of the agricultural growth rate, which, historically, has remained at just below 3 percent. 
Benin et al. (2008) show that if agricultural growth is maintained at 6 percent over the period 2005–
15, the national GDP growth rate in Uganda will increase by one percentage point (that is, from 5.1 to 
6.1 percent). Agricultural growth also has spillover effects into the rest of the economy, with 
agroprocessing or food-processing and trade and transport sectors benefiting from more rapid growth. 
More importantly, however, are the poverty-reducing effects of rapid agricultural growth. Benin et al. 
(2008) show that under an accelerated agricultural growth path the poverty rate in 2015 will be 7.6 
percentage points lower than the forecasted level under the business as usual growth path. This is 
equivalent to an additional 2.9 million people being lifted out of poverty by 2015. 
Benin et al. (2008) extend their analysis to focus on specific agricultural subsectors’ 
effectiveness at reducing poverty and generating growth through size and economic linkage effects. In 
this regard they find that horticultural crops, root crops, livestock, and cereals have the greatest 
poverty-reducing potential in Uganda. This is due both to the crop choices of resource-poor farmers 
and to the preferences of poor consumers (increased productivity lowers farmers’ unit production 
costs and benefits consumers via price reductions). Given their initial size, growth potential, and 
economic linkages, growth in subsectors such as roots, matooke (cooking banana), pulses and 
oilseeds, and export crops contribute most to overall growth. 
Using a similar methodology, Dorosh and Thurlow (2009) focus more closely on the relative 
impacts of rural versus urban public investments in Uganda. In general, they find that improving 
agricultural productivity generates more broad-based welfare improvements in both rural and urban 
areas than investing in the capital city, Kampala. Although investing in Kampala accelerates 
economic growth, it has little effect on other regions’ welfare because of the city’s weak regional 
growth linkages and small migration effects. In a study in Peru, Thurlow, Morley, and Pratt (2008) 
find that by investing in the leading (more urbanized) region, that country may be undermining the 
economy in the lagging (mostly rural) region by increasing import competition and internal migration. 
The authors also show that the divergence between the leading and lagging regions can only be 
bridged by investing in the lagging region’s productivity through providing extension services and 
improved rural roads. 
This brief overview suggests that public investments in rural areas and agriculture should be a 
critical part of the development strategy in Uganda if the country is to achieve its goals of reducing 
(rural) poverty and narrowing the welfare gap between urban and rural areas. Studies cited show that 
investments in cities or major urban centers such as Kampala, although good for growth there, may in 
fact be harmful or at best neutral for growth or welfare in rural areas. Either way, such investments 
will lead to rising rural–urban inequality, which is an undesirable socioeconomic outcome. The 
challenge is to be strategic about how and where to invest so that productivity gains in priority sectors 
or subsectors are maximized. Certain types of investments have obvious impacts; for example, 
investments in rural roads, irrigation infrastructure, or water storage will benefit agriculture, and  
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depending on the exact location (or agronomic zone) of those investments, specific subsectors within 
agriculture. For other types of investments, such as telecommunications, it is likely that urban-based 
manufacturing sectors would benefit more, but there may still be intended or unintended productivity 
spillovers into other sectors. It is also important to realize that there may be a lag from the time the 
investment in agriculture is made until productivity spillovers materialize and rural poverty declines. 
The immediate beneficiaries of increased agricultural investment spending are more likely to be those 
nonpoor workers supplying investment services or producing investment goods rather than poor 
farming households themselves. 
Uganda’s Investment Needs 
As Uganda gears up toward becoming an oil producer, the first priority is to install infrastructure that 
would facilitate the oil extraction, transportation, and (possibly) refining processes. Substantial 
investment—a figure of $10 billion has been mentioned—will be required to set up the oil industry, 
and production will probably only reach its peak by 2017 (World Bank 2010). There are some 
challenges; for example, the quality of the crude oil is said to be waxy and viscous, thus requiring 
some heating in order to transport it via pipeline. Also, the oil fields are located in a fairly remote part 
of Uganda, which means good rail and road networks will be required to link the oil fields to export 
markets or local refineries or both. 
The issue of whether local refining capacity should be developed is still being discussed. 
Some argue that the size of the domestic or regional market does not warrant the cost of developing 
the required infrastructure, and that Uganda should instead export all its crude oil via a pipeline 
connecting Uganda with the coast of Kenya. However, a recent study by Foster Wheeler (2010), a 
Swiss consultancy firm, has recommended that Uganda refine oil in the country instead of exporting 
crude oil. They argue that the costs and risks associated with the building of an oil refinery or pipeline 
are similar, which means they may as well invest domestically and benefit from the value addition in 
the country, however small. Domestic refining capacity, they further argue, would ensure more secure 
domestic fuel supplies, create more jobs, and have a more favorable outcome on the balance of 
payments and exchange rate compared to a model where all crude oil is exported. Another idea under 
consideration is that of developing a refinery in the Kenyan coastal town of Mombasa under a joint 
venture with this neighboring country. Its location would facilitate international trade of crude oil and 
refined crude oil products (should that need exist), while a pipeline would connect this location with 
the oil fields in Uganda. 
Once the up-front investment needs have been met and oil production is under way, the 
expectation is that oil revenues will be used in part to narrow the infrastructure gap in Uganda. 
Infrastructure services in the country are considered weak (World Bank 2007). This is especially true 
for the transport sector. Despite fairly rapid growth over the past two decades—at times in excess of 9 
percent per year—the share of the transport sector in GDP has only increased marginally from around 
3 percent in 1998 to 3.4 percent in 2008 (see Table 2.1). Only about 4 percent of domestic cargo 
freight is transported via the country’s largely dysfunctional railway system, which currently operates 
at 26 percent capacity. This stands in contrast to China and India, where over 90 percent of cargo is 
transported via rail. The remaining cargo is transported via the road network, which is also 
underdeveloped (for example, only 4 percent of the Ugandan road network is paved). It costs more 
than three times as much to transport goods by road than by rail, yet the fact that 96 percent of goods 
are still moved via road is indicative of just how inefficient railway transport is. Inefficiencies and 
weak transport infrastructure therefore add significantly to the cost of doing business in Uganda, 
while they also act as implicit barriers to domestic and international trade (for example, some 
estimates suggest that excessive transport costs in Uganda vis-à-vis those of competitors are 
equivalent to a 25 percent tax on Ugandan exports).  
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Table 2.1—Share of some of the infrastructural sectors in GDP and growth performance in 
Uganda, 1988–2008 
  Percentage share in nominal GDP  Growth performance (percent) 
   1988  1997  2004  2007  2008 1988–97  1998–2002  2004–08  2007  2008 
Transport  3.0  3.9  3.2  3.3  3.4  9.3  5.3  6.8  9.6  6.9 
Energy and water  0.6  1.3  3.5  4.5  4.1  7.6  6.2  2.0  5.3  4.0 
Trade  14.7  10.0  12.7  14.1  14.3  7.6  6.5  10.3  13.0  13.6 
Financial services  -  2.3  2.8  2.9  3.2  -  5.5  11.2  -3.9  11.1 
Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) Statistical Abstract (various).  
The energy and water sectors also face major challenges. Although these sectors’ share of 
GDP increased from 0.6 percent in 1988 to 4.1 percent in 2008, growth has been erratic and appears 
to have slowed down since the 2000s relative to the previous decade. Uganda has one of the lowest 
per capita electricity consumption levels in the world at only 60 kilowatt-hours per year. In 
comparison, annual usage in South Africa and Egypt is 4,200 kilowatt-hours and 1,200 kilowatt-
hours, respectively. Low electricity use relates partly to only 11 percent of the population being 
connected to the grid. However, low usage rates also are explained by excessively high electricity 
tariffs. Consumers in Uganda face some of the highest tariffs in the world, which at $0.22 per 
kilowatt-hour is second only to Sweden and significantly higher than the cost of electricity in 
neighboring Tanzania ($0.08 per kilowatt-hour) and Kenya ($0.13 per kilowatt-hour). The state of 
water supply and sanitation is equally worrying. At an annual consumptive use of water for 
production of 21 cubic meters per capita, Uganda’s usage is far below the world average (599 cubic 
meters per capita). Furthermore, only 63 percent of the rural population and 72 percent of the urban 
population have access to safe water. 
The infrastructural challenge facing the country has compelled the Ugandan government to 
ramp up the share of the budget allocated to infrastructure spending, beginning with the 2007/08 
budget. The budget allocation for infrastructure investment for the year 2008 was $196.9 million or 
2.7 percent of GDP. A further $54.3 million was allocated to current spending (for example, 
maintenance and operation costs), while the private sector (that is, nonfinancial enterprises) 
contributed $247.2 million, split in roughly equal shares between infrastructure investments and 
current spending. This implies total infrastructural expenditure of $498.5, or 7.4 percent of GDP (see 
Table 2.2), which is comparable with levels of infrastructural spending in Kenya (9.7 percent) and 
Tanzania (7.2 percent), but much higher than Rwanda (3.9 percent). 
Table 2.2—Infrastructure investments and current spending in Uganda, by sector, 2008 









































































ICT*  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Electricity  24.5  120.9  8.1  103.3  256.8  0.3  2.0  0.1  1.6  4.1 
Transport  130.9  0.4  33.0  22.6  186.9  1.8  0.1  0.5  0.4  2.6 
Water and 
sanitation  41.5  0.0  13.1  0.0  54.6  0.6  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.8 
Total   196.9  121.3  54.3  125.9  498.5  2.7  2.1  0.7  1.9  7.4 
Source: World Bank Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) (2008). 
Notes: Rehabilitation costs are treated as investments, whereas current spending includes operational costs and maintenance. 
(*) ICT = Information communication technologies.  
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The infrastructure spending estimates in Table 2.2 indicate that improvement in electricity 
provisioning is a priority in Uganda, with just over half of the overall infrastructure spending 
allocated to this sector. Most of the spending was paid for by the private sector. Infrastructure 
spending in the transport and water and sanitation sectors amounted to $186.9 million (38 percent) 
and $54.6 million (11 percent), respectively, with the bulk of costs covered by government. 
In spite of the increases in infrastructure investments, Uganda’s infrastructural needs are still 
enormous. Meeting these needs and developing cost-effective modes of infrastructure service delivery 
require a comprehensive program of investment, rehabilitation, and disciplined maintenance. A recent 
study estimates that the annual infrastructural spending required to eliminate infrastructure backlogs 
and meet future demands in Uganda is $912 million per year (see Table 2.3), maintained over a 10-
year spending period running up to 2015. This is almost double the spending level in 2008 (compare 
Table 2.2). In terms of the structure of this spending, substantially more funds need to be allocated to 
the ICT sector than is currently the case. Higher spending is also required in transport and water and 
sanitation, and spending on electricity generation capacity should be ramped up by 75 percent.  
Table 2.3—Annual infrastructure spending needs in Uganda ($ million), 2006–15 
  Annual spending needs ($ millions) 
Comparative 
spending from 







ICT  81  80  161  0 
Electricity  385  65  450  257 
Transport  183  38  221  187 
Water and 
sanitation  61  19  80  55 
Total   710  202  912  499 
Source: World Bank Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) (2009). 
Note: ICT = Information communication technologies 
Other Spending Options: Transferring Rents to Citizens 
The massive infrastructural spending backlogs in Uganda mean much of the policy discussion around 
spending of oil revenue has and will continue to focus on public investments. However, infrastructural 
spending is not the only option open to government. Some argue that oil revenues should be spent on 
the provisioning of social protection: Since citizens in effect own the oil resource, the most 
appropriate approach is to transfer revenues back to them. Social protection can be broadly defined. 
Benefits transferred to citizens can be in the form of tax breaks (for example, income or consumption 
tax cuts); subsidies (for example, direct price subsidies, employment subsidies, or investment 
subsidies); job creation schemes; or direct transfers (Gelb and Grasmann 2010). Not all these transfer 
mechanisms necessarily involve a direct transfer from government to households; some work 
indirectly via employment or consumption. 
Gelb and Grasmann (2010, 12–16) briefly review the merits of and justification for each of 
these benefits. A lower tax burden, they explain, might reduce the deadweight costs of taxation, 
provided the quality of tax administration does not decline at the same time. Lower taxes, in general, 
will encourage economic activity, thus compensating export sectors in particular for the adverse effect 
of a stronger exchange rate. Domestic price subsidies are popular for obvious reasons. A common 
type of subsidy in oil-producing economies is one on petroleum products; in fact, in many countries 
petroleum prices are kept far below market levels at a subsidy cost equivalent to “several percentage 
points of GDP” (Gelb and Grasmann 2010, 13). An approach that is used “more widely in the Middle 
East than elsewhere (2010, 14) is public-sector job creation. One estimate suggests that around 80 
percent of jobs in Gulf are in the public sector (for example, in Kuwait, employment for nationals is 
virtually guaranteed). 
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Very few countries have considered the use of oil revenues to finance direct welfare transfers. 
However, there is increasing interest in distribution mechanisms such as those pioneered in Alaska 
“as the shortcomings of other approaches become more apparent” (Gelb and Grasmann 2010, 14). 
Cash transfers or grants have two primary functions: They reduce short-term poverty and inequality, 
and they provide safety nets that enable households to manage risk (Pauw and Mncube 2007). There 
are several design options. First, grants can be targeted or universal. Targeted grants are more costly 
to administer, but targeting improves efficiency in terms of reductions in poverty and inequality. 
Under a universal grant scheme all citizens have access to a grant, irrespective of their socioeconomic 
status. Second, grants can be conditional or unconditional. Conditional grants, as the name suggests, 
are only accessible by households that comply with certain provisions, such as attending school or 
visiting health clinics. 
The successes of conditional programs such as Bolsa Familia in Brazil and Opportunidades in 
Mexico have been widely reported (see, for example, Adato and Hoddinott 2010). However, just like 
targeting, conditionality increases the administrative burden of these programs, both for 
administrators who need to determine eligibility of prospective participants and for health and 
education service providers who need to deal with the mandatory increase in demand for these 
services. For this reason conditionality may not always a good idea, especially in countries where 
administrative capacity is low or where social service delivery is weak (Pauw and Mncube 2007). The 
alternative (that is, a nontargeted unconditional grant scheme) is costly, but the large influx of oil 
revenues in Uganda puts the country in a position where it can probably afford such a basic income 
grant. Although a uniformly distributed grant will not improve inequality, it will reduce poverty, 
while at the same time policymakers can avoid sensitivities that may arise when oil revenues—seen 
by all as a national resource—are unequally distributed.  
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3.  DATA, CGE MODEL, AND SIMULATION SETUP 
Evolution and Structure of the Ugandan Economy 
Recent GDP figures reflect a continuation of the restructuring process that has been a feature of 
Uganda’s economy over the past three decades. This has seen the importance of agricultural output 
decline in favor of production in industry and services (Table 3.1). At 50 percent of GDP, the services 
sector is now the largest sector in the economy. It is also the most dynamic, with rapid growth in 
recent years in areas such as telecommunications, financial services, trade, and hotels and restaurants. 
Despite its declining size in terms of output, agriculture remains the largest employer, with an 
estimated 80 percent of the population living in households that earn income from farming activities. 
Although there has been a significant increase in export crop production, subsistence farming still 
provides the bulk of food production and accounts for almost half of agricultural output. Industry 
accounts for around a quarter of GDP (Economic Intelligence Unit 2009). High growth in this sector 
has been restricted by the country’s poor transport and energy infrastructure (see earlier discussion). 
Table 3.1—Sectoral share of real GDP by sector, 1970–2009 
   1970  1980  1990  2000  2005  2009 
Agriculture  53.8  72.0  56.6  29.4  26.7  24.7 
Industry  13.7  4.5  11.1  22.9  25.0  25.8 
Manufacturing  9.2  4.3  5.7  7.6  7.5  8.0 
Services  32.5  23.5  32.4  47.7  48.3  49.5 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: World Bank 2011. 
More detailed sectoral characteristics of the Ugandan economy can be obtained from the 
Ugandan 2007 social accounting matrix (SAM), which underlies the computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model used in this study. The SAM, developed by Thurlow, Morley, and Pratt (2008), requires 
some modification for the present analysis. Crude oil is not currently produced in Uganda, and there is 
also no oil refining capacity in the country. As a result, oil production and refined oil sectors had to be 
incorporated into the SAM. Initially these sectors’ contributions to national output are assumed to be 
negligible, but their input structures are defined carefully so that these sectors’ impacts on the rest of 
the economy (that is, via intermediate input linkages, employment, and returns to capital) are 
precisely captured as these sectors start to grow in the modeled oil production scenarios. Detailed 
costing has not been done for oil production and refining in Uganda; hence, in creating these sectors 
we apply the input structures (or technology vectors) from the Nigerian SAM for 2006 (Nwafor, Diao, 
and Alpuerto 2010). These vectors are shown in Table 3.2. The intermediate input coefficients are 
aggregated in the table. In the actual SAM intermediate input spending is disaggregated across several 
sectors included in the SAM. 
Table 3.2—Input structures for crude oil and refining sectors in Nigeria, 2006 
   Crude oil  Refined oil 
Intermediate inputs  7.77  78.62 
Value-added     
Labor  0.25  0.25 
Capital  91.98  21.13 
Total  100.00  100.00 
Source: Nwafor, Diao, and Alpuerto 2010.  
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The Nigerian technology vectors display a typical picture of an oil-enclave sector with low 
backward linkages via intermediate input demand and low labor inputs in both crude oil production 
and refining. Both sectors are highly capital intensive and most of the value-added is distributed to 
owners of the capital invested in these sectors. The Ugandan oil extraction and refining sectors are 
likely to display similar characteristics. We assume owners of capital to be foreign investors (for 
example, international oil companies), whereas government’s share of oil revenue is extracted via a 
direct tax (of 74.4 percent) on returns to capital. In reality, government’s share of oil revenue will 
consist of a combination of direct revenue sharing (which may fluctuate over time) and corporate tax 
revenue on oil company profits. The 74.4 percent direct tax rate imposed therefore represents the tax 
equivalent of the combined rate of revenue sharing and corporate tax rate, averaged out over the 
period. The crude oil technology vector implies that most of the impact of oil production will be 
determined by how government spends the revenue domestically; at only 0.25 percent of output, the 
GDP contribution (or value addition) of oil production activity is likely to be limited. Further details 
of the SAM modification are provided in the Appendix (Section 7). 
With the inclusion of new oil production and refining sectors, the modified SAM includes 52 
economic sectors, each representing a typical producer or activity in that sector. Of these, 21 are in 
agriculture. This level of detail is appropriate given the interest in how oil might affect the agricultural 
sector. It is further justified by the fact that, even though the sector itself has become relatively small 
in recent years, it remains important in terms of employment and its linkages with other sectors such 
as food processing, manufacturing, and services. Agricultural subsectors also tend to be 
heterogeneous in terms of their input structures and marketing channels. In terms of the latter, the 
ability to differentiate between export sectors and those that produce mainly for the domestic market 
is particularly useful in the present context. 
As shown in Table 3.3 (Part A), we broadly classify agricultural crops in the model into six 
groups, namely: (1) cereal crops, (2) root crops, (3) matooke, (4) pulses and oilseeds, (5) horticulture, 
and (6) export-oriented crops. The CGE model further identifies three livestock subsectors, namely, 
cattle, poultry, and other livestock, as well as forestry and fisheries subsectors. The 31 nonagricultural 
sectors found in the SAM are listed in Table 3.3 (Part B). Broadly speaking, nonagricultural sectors 
can be grouped into two groups, namely, industrial and services subsectors. Industrial sectors include 
(1) mining, (2) food-processing or agroprocessing sectors, (3) nonfood manufacturing, and (4) other 
industry. Services, in turn, include (5) private services and (6) government services. 
Production characteristics for each sector are shown in Table 3.3 in the columns labeled (1) to 
(10). The first column shows gross output agriculture in the Uganda SAM contributes 18 percent to 
total output (note Table 3.1 shows value-added or GDP). Within agriculture, subsistence farming of 
cereals, root crops, matooke, and cattle account for around 60 percent of total agricultural production. 
Industry, in turn, contributes 35.2 percent, a third of which is from food-processing or agroprocessing 
sectors. The construction sector is the largest subsector in Uganda, contributing 14.4 percent to total 
output. Services sectors contribute 46.8 percent to output, with the trade sector (12.3 percent) 
dominating. 
Column (2) shows the employment shares across the various subsectors. The fairly labor-
intensive agricultural sector employs 23.2 percent of the workforce, made up mostly of self-employed 
family labor. This figure, however, understates the true importance of the agricultural sector as a 
provider of household income, since about 80 percent of the population lives in households that are 
attached to the agricultural sector. Industrial sectors are significantly more capital intensive; although 
the sector contributes more than one-third to GDP, it only offers employment to 13.7 percent of the 
workforce. In contrast, the employment share in the labor-intensive-services sector is relatively high 
at 63.1 percent. 
Column (3) shows each sector’s share of expenditure on value addition. The balance of 
expenditure is on intermediate inputs. The latter provides an indication of the strength of a sector’s 
backward linkages in the economy (compare Table 3.2). High value-added ratios in the agricultural, 
natural resource–based sectors (such as crude oil) and in most services sectors are indicative of 
relatively small backward linkages. In contrast, the manufacturing sectors, particularly food 




Table 3.3—Production and trade characteristics in Uganda, 2007 
Part A: Agriculture  Production characteristics(percentages, see text)    Trade characteristics(percentages, see text) 
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Import share of 
domestic  
supply 
  Cereal crops                               
1  Maize  0.80  0.92  89.30  21.08  1.78     5.43        71.71    1.76  19.95  0.85  21.62 
2  Rice  0.20  0.22  91.66  19.17  1.62    5.84      73.37        0.34  26.94 
3  Other cereals  0.82  0.72  87.51  16.72  1.42    6.37      75.49        2.14  35.53 
  Root crops                               
4  Cassava  1.47  1.00  87.98  12.76  1.08    7.23      78.93            
5  Irish potato  0.52  0.28  49.99  17.78  1.50    6.14      74.57            
6  Sweet potato  1.18  0.87  82.54  14.81  1.25    6.79      77.15            
7  Matooke  1.55  1.17  96.85  12.83  1.09    7.22      78.87            
  Pulses and oilseeds                               
8  Oilseeds  0.39  0.41  98.04  17.69  1.50    6.16      74.65    0.16  3.81  0.14  7.27 
9  Beans  2.01  1.15  71.80  13.14  1.11    7.15      78.60    4.07  17.41      
  Horticulture                               
10  Vegetable  0.06  0.06  90.97  19.13  1.62    5.85      73.40            
11  Fruits and tree crops  0.12  0.12  90.73  19.22  1.63    5.83      73.32            
  Export crops                               
12  Cotton  0.12  0.10  68.28  20.32  1.72    22.37      55.59    1.13  100.00      
13  Tobacco  0.46  0.43  91.40  16.96  1.44    25.29      56.32    3.81  91.96      
14  Flowers  0.24  0.09  39.52  14.71  1.25    27.23      56.81    2.21  100.00      
15  Coffee  0.82  0.54  72.97  14.79  1.25    27.16      56.79    7.48  100.00      
16 
Tea, cocoa, and 
vanilla  0.26  0.37  81.55  28.55  2.42    15.23      53.81 
 
2.40  100.00      
  Livestock                               
17  Cattle and sheep  1.13  1.44  66.60  31.59  2.67        65.74               
18  Other livestock  0.19  0.27  89.33  26.20  2.22        71.58       0.23  11.59      
19  Poultry  0.22  0.15  48.56  22.37  1.89        75.74               
20  Forestry  3.43  9.61  70.80     70.99    29.01                   
21  Fisheries  2.01  3.33  92.56     32.02    67.98           5.47  26.09      
   Total agriculture  18.01  23.24     11.84  17.14     19.71     4.86  46.45    28.72  16.36  3.48  4.55  
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Table 3.3—Continued 
Part B(1): Nonagriculture: 
(Industry)  Production characteristics(percentages, see text) 
 
Trade characteristics(percentages, see text) 
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  Mining                                
22  Mining  0.24  0.19  79.33     14.39  3.27  82.34           0.69  24.02  0.94  51.25 
23 
Oil 
production  0.06  < 0.01  92.32     0.22  0.05    99.73      
 
        
  Food/agro-processing                               
24 
Meat 
processing  1.01  0.03  5.35     9.32     90.68          
 
0.75  5.76  0.80  13.72 
25 
Fish 
processing  0.69  0.14  8.51     19.43  23.13  57.43        
 
5.64  60.04  0.55  26.91 
26 
Other food 
processing  4.18  1.85  22.29     16.27  19.37  64.36        
 
9.90  20.05  4.27  21.80 
27 
Grain 
processing  1.64  0.23  26.39     9.58    90.42        
 
    1.08  13.09 
28  Feedstock  0.30  0.07  18.91     21.16    78.84                   
29 
Beverage 
and tobacco  3.08  1.34  30.08     17.76  8.21  74.02          
 
0.56  1.43  1.01  6.90 
  Nonfood manufacturing                               
30 
Textiles and 
clothing  0.73  0.44  47.57     22.50    77.50        
 
1.91  17.69  3.72  48.65 
31 
Wood and 
paper  0.38  0.12  28.21     20.74    79.26        
 
    1.28  46.51 
32  Refined oil  0.02  < 0.01  21.38     0.48  0.69    98.83         0.48  100.00      
33 
Petrol and 
diesel  0.07  0.01  6.42     9.52  13.51  76.97        
 
    8.27  96.14 
34 
Other 
chemicals  1.43  0.45  34.31     6.74  9.57  83.69        
 
1.18  6.92  9.21  56.99 
35  Fertilizer  0.01  0.01  67.17     8.33  11.82  79.85               1.97  89.10 
36 
Other 
manufacturing  1.67  0.60  44.86     9.86  4.56  85.58        
 
1.51  8.88  7.35  54.04 
37  Machinery and 
equipment  1.42  0.52  32.18     14.52  5.81  79.67        
 
4.62  32.57  29.79  86.68  
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Table 3.3—Continued 
Part B(1): Nonagriculture: 
(Industry)  Production characteristics(percentages, see text) 
 
Trade characteristics(percentages, see text) 
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38  Furniture  0.56  0.32  44.63     22.96    77.04               0.42  15.11 
  Other industry                               
39 
Energy and 
water  3.31  2.64  89.49     1.07  14.90  84.03        
 
1.49  4.94      
40  Construction  14.43  4.72  64.12     8.55  0.59  90.86                   
                                 
 
Total 
industry  35.25  13.69                 
 
       
 
Part B(2): Nonagriculture: 
(Services)  Production characteristics(percentages, see text) 
 
Trade characteristics(percentages, see text) 
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  Private services                               
41  Trade  12.28  9.28  62.95     17.91  3.61  78.48                   
42 
Hotels and 
catering  3.57  2.16  80.80     11.89  1.51  86.59        
 
29.09  89.65      
43  Transport  3.73  2.22  68.97     15.07  0.38  84.54           11.58  34.19  20.28  64.10 
44  Communications  2.67  2.91  50.85     7.87  30.57  61.55           0.90  3.71  0.38  3.13 
45  Banking  1.10  3.34  61.89     22.35  65.52  12.13           0.65  6.50  1.79  27.35 
46  Real estate  6.96  0.24  81.96       0.76  99.24                   
47 
Other private 
services  1.59  1.18  85.69     15.46    84.54        
 
0.33  2.29  3.40  32.08 
 
Government 
services                     
 
       
48 
Research and 
development  0.01  0.01  49.95     6.45  53.46  40.09        
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Table 3.3—Continued 
Part B(2): Nonagriculture: 
(Services)  Production characteristics(percentages, see text) 
 
Trade characteristics (percentages, see text) 




















stock  Land 














administration  4.39  13.22  60.13     9.64  79.98  10.37        
 
        
50  Education  7.13  22.30  68.30     8.83  73.21  17.96                   
51  Health  1.99  3.79  55.24     6.66  55.25  38.08                   
52 
Community 
services  1.33  2.42  65.16     29.55  20.46  49.99        
 
        
                                 
  Total services  46.75  63.07                           
  
Total 
nonagriculture  81.99  76.76        10.53  17.48  71.90  0.09       
 
71.28  8.72  96.52  24.69 




100.00  10.10  100.00  21.67 
Source: Ugandan 2007 SAM (Thurlow et al. 2008). 
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Columns (4) to (10) show the factor income shares within sectors (that is, the row entries 
across these seven columns sum to 100). The SAM includes three main labor categories, namely, self-
employed farm labor (only employed in agriculture), unskilled workers (employed across all sectors), 
and skilled workers (only employed in nonagricultural sectors). Other factors include capital stock (a 
separate capital stock category was created for capital stock employed in the newly created oil 
production and refining sectors), cattle, and land (the latter two factors are only employed in 
agriculture). Within agriculture, food and cash crop sectors are land intensive, with returns to land 
representing about 50 percent of value-added. Returns on livestock average about 70 percent of value-
added. The production structures in the forestry and fisheries sectors are more akin to those in 
industrial sectors, that is, a relatively large share of value-added goes to capital (for example, in 
fisheries) or unskilled labor (for example, in forestry). Industrial and services sectors are generally 
capital intensive, the exception being banking and public sectors, which are more skilled-labor 
intensive. Labor use in capital-intensive industrial and services sectors also follows a fairly 
predictable pattern, with food-processing and consumer goods sectors spending relatively more on 
unskilled labor, whereas the other manufacturing sectors are relatively skilled-labor intensive. 
The final four columns in Table 3.3 provide information on each sector’s share in total 
foreign exchange earnings and expenditures together with each sector’s trade orientation. Column 
(12) indicates that agriculture exports about 16 percent of its production, with cotton, tobacco, 
flowers, coffee, tea, cocoa, and vanilla being the most export-oriented sectors in the economy. Other 
sectors with a high share of exports in domestic production are fish processing and hotels and 
catering. Overall, nonagriculture is less export-oriented than agriculture, with exports only accounting 
for about 9 percent of total supply. The single most important foreign exchange earner is the tourism 
sector (hotels and catering), which contributes almost 30 percent to total foreign exchange earnings 
from exports. On the import side, the sectoral shares of total import expenditures in column (13) and 
the shares of imports in sectoral demand in column (14) are of interest. These show that about 70 
percent of import expenditures are on imports of capital and intermediate goods, as well as the related 
transport services. 
The Ugandan Recursive-Dynamic CGE Model 
This study applies a single-country recursive-dynamic CGE for Uganda (also used by Benin et al. 
2008) to investigate the effects of oil production and to consider alternative options for spending oil 
revenue. This modeling tool is useful as it captures the important direct and indirect effects associated 
with oil production and the spending of oil revenues. In a similar study to this one, Breisinger et al. 
(2009) also use a CGE model to examine the potential trade-offs between spending and saving of oil 
revenues in Ghana. The CGE model is a member of the class of single country neoclassical CGE 
models first developed by Dervis, de Melo, and Robinson (1982) and features endogenous prices, 
market clearing, and imperfect substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Below we highlight 
some of the key features of the Ugandan model. A detailed model description and equation listing can 
be found in Thurlow (2004). 
Private Production and Consumption 
Producers and consumers in the model are assumed to enjoy no market power in world markets, so 
the terms of trade are independent of domestic policy choices. Firms in each of the 52 economic 
sectors (or activities) are assumed to be perfectly competitive, producing a single good that can be 
sold to either the domestic or the export market. Production in each sector i is determined by a 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function of the form 
  Qi = Ai · Σf{δfi · Ffi
-ρi}
-1/ρi,   (1) 
where f is a set of factors consisting of land, cattle, capital, and different labor categories; Qi is the 
sectoral activity level; Ai the sectoral total factor productivity; Ffi the quantity of factor f demanded 
from sector i; and δfi and ρfi are the distributional and elasticity parameters of the CES production 
function, respectively. Only agricultural crop production requires land. Sectoral supply growth of land 
is fixed. Sector capital endowments are fixed in each period but evolve over time through depreciation  
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and investment. Capital and labor markets are competitive so that these factors are employed in each 
sector up to the point that they are paid the value of their marginal product. Private-sector output is 
also determined by the level of infrastructure, which is provided costless by the government. We 
assume that total sector factor productivity Ai depends on the availability of public infrastructure. 
Consumption for each household type is defined by a constant elasticity of substitution linear 
expenditure system, which allows for the income elasticity of demand for different goods to deviate 
from unity. The CGE model endogenously estimates the impact of alternative growth paths on the 
incomes of various household groups. These household groups include farm and nonfarm households 
and are disaggregated across rural areas, the major city of Kampala, and other smaller urban centers. 
Each of the households questioned in the 2005/06 Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS5) are 
linked directly to their corresponding representative household in the CGE model. This is the 
microsimulation component of the Ugandan model. Changes in representative households’ 
consumption and prices in the CGE model are passed down to the corresponding households in the 
survey, where standard poverty measures and changes in poverty are calculated. 
Macroeconomic Closures and Dynamics 
The model has a neoclassical closure in which total private investment is constrained by total savings 
net of public investment. Household savings propensities are exogenous. This rule implies that any 
shortfall in government savings relative to the cost of government capital formation, net of exogenous 
foreign savings, directly crowds out private investment. Likewise, any excess of government savings 
directly crowds in private investment. 
The model has a simple recursive-dynamic structure. Each solution run tracks the economy 
over 40 periods. Each period may be thought of as a fiscal year (that is, from year 2007 to 2046). 
Within-year capital stocks are fixed, and the model is solved given the parameters of the experiment 
(for example, exogenous growth in the oil production or refining sector, or changes in import tariffs 
on fuels). This solution defines a new vector of prices and quantities for the economy, including the 
level of public- and private-sector investment, which feed into the equations of motion for sectoral 
capital stocks. The equation is specified as 
  Ki,t = Ki,t-1(1-μi) + ΔKi,t-1,  (2) 
where Ki,t is the capital stock, μi denotes the sector-specific rate of depreciation, and t-1 measures the 
gestation lag on investment. 
The final element is an externality resulting from public investment in infrastructure. Public 
investment is assumed to generate an improvement in total factor productivity. Specifically, equation 
(1) assumes that Αi,t = Αi for nonspillover sectors, whereas in the spillover sectors, denoted s, total 
factor productivities evolve according to 






sg,  (3) 
where g denotes a set of public investments defined over rural and urban infrastructure, health and 
education, and so on; I
g and Qs are real government investment and sectoral output levels; and I
g
0 and 
Qs,0 are the correspondingly defined public investments and output levels in the base period. The 
terms ρsg measure the extent of the spillovers. If ρsg = 0, there is no spillover from public investment in 
infrastructure or health and education. The higher ρsg, the higher are spillovers. 
The total population, workforce, area of arable land, number of livestock, and income from abroad are 
examples of other variables that evolve over time according to exogenously defined assumptions. The 
growing population generates a higher level of consumption demand and therefore raises the 
supernumerary income level of household consumption within the linear expenditure system (LES) 
specific to each household and subject to the constraints of available income and the consumer price 




The baseline scenario serves as the counterfactual against which other scenario results are compared. 
Scenarios are solved over the period 2007–46, which roughly coincides with the forecasted crude oil 
extraction period. The baseline (simulation name BASELINE) is a no oil scenario, which assumes a 
continuation of the business as usual growth path for Uganda over the coming decades (that is, 
without the establishment of crude oil extraction and refining industries). Growth rates for total factor 
productivity, factor supply, foreign capital inflow, and real government consumption follow recent 
historical trends or are set at levels such that GDP at factor cost is targeted to grow at an annual 
average rate of 5.1 percent until 2046 (see Table 4.1, Part A). The table further provides a breakdown 
of this growth into its different components. Absorption, which includes private consumption (5 
percent), investment expenditure (4.4 percent), and government expenditure (exogenously set to grow 
at 3 percent), grows at 4.7 percent per year. Export growth outpaces import growth, mainly due to 
domestic factor productivity growth, which makes exporters more competitive in international 
markets. The result is a declining trade deficit, while the exogenously imposed 3 percent growth in 
foreign capital inflows causes the real exchange rate to appreciate on average by 0.9 percent per year. 
The results in BASELINE reveal the so-called Balassa-Samuelson effect, where tradable 
sectors with higher than average productivity increases and lower income elasticities of demand grow 
less than nontradable sectors, such as services. Thus, as expected under this growth scenario, the 
economic structure will continue to change in favor of services and industry. Table 4.1 (Part D) shows 
that the share of the agricultural sector in total GDP decreases from 22.6 percent in 2007 to 15.8 
percent in 2046, which is a result of a relative decline in agricultural prices driven primarily by 
relatively lower domestic demand for agricultural products and domestic terms of trade effects, which 
cause an appreciation in the real exchange rate. In contrast, the services sector continues to expand, 
contributing 62.5 percent of GDP by 2046. 
Table 4.1 (Part E) shows the different sources of growth. Economic growth is the outcome of 
increasing levels of factor supply (that is, labor supply, expansion of agricultural cropland, and capital 
accumulation) and the more productive use of those factors in the production process. In BASELINE 
unskilled- and skilled-labor supply growth rates are set exogenously at 2 and 3 percent per year, 
respectively. The more rapid skilled-labor supply growth rate reflects gradual improvements in 
educational attainment over time. Agricultural family labor grows at 2.5 percent per year, which is 
just below the population growth rate of 3 percent. Land and livestock expansions are set according to 
recent historical trends at 2 percent each. Total factor productivity growth is exogenously defined for 
each sector and varies across sectors. The increase in labor and land supply, combined with 
improvements in total factor productivity, stimulates savings and investments, resulting in an average 
annual capital accumulation growth rate of 2 percent per year. The breakdown provided in the table 
suggests that increases in labor supply only explain 15 percent of the base-run growth over the next 40 
years, whereas land expansion explains 5 percent and capital 40 percent. The remaining 40 percent of 
growth is explained by productivity growth in the base run. 
Modeling Oil Production and Refining 
Several oil production and refining scenarios are modeled. All involve the same fairly rapid growth 
path for oil production shown earlier in Figure 2.1. Growth is fastest between 2007 and 2017 when 
peak oil production is reached. Peak production levels are then maintained for about a decade, before 
production is gradually phased out over the next two decades until recoverable reserves are exhausted 
by 2046. The expansion is simulated by exogenously raising or lowering the level capital stock 
available to the crude oil refining sector. The implicit assumption is that capital stock expansion is 
funded (almost) entirely by foreign direct investment. However, although the decision to invest is 
made exogenously by foreign investors, the oil sector still has to compete with other sectors for 
intermediate inputs and, to a much lesser extent, for labor resources. Furthermore, depending on how 
government spends its oil revenue (for example, government may spend more on public infrastructure 
or government services), the demand for labor will rise rapidly in those sectors required to satisfy 
government demand (for example, suppliers of machinery and equipment, construction services, or  
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public service providers). All crude oil is supplied to the refining sector. Supply bottlenecks are 
avoided by applying a similar capital stock growth rate to the refining sector as the one that 
determines crude oil production levels. 
The CGE model assumes full employment, which means that total labor supply is determined 
by the long labor supply growth rates, whereas an increase in labor demanded per unit of capital raises 
workers’ relative wages. Profits—or returns to capital stock—generated in the oil production and 
refining sectors are shared between the foreign owners of capital (their share is repatriated) and the 
Ugandan government (revenue is transferred via a 74.4 percent tax on returns to capital). These profits 
originate by and large from refined oil exports. All crude oil is supplied to the oil refineries, and for 
the sake of simplicity all refined oil is assumed to be exported. Domestic demand for petroleum 
products is, in turn, met by imports. In reality, some of the refined oil product will be retained for 
domestic consumption and the country will cease to import petroleum products, but modeling it in this 
manner is simpler and does not affect results since the balance of payments effect is symmetrical. 
Although we are able to accurately replicate forecasted oil production quantities through 
raising capital stock in the oil production and refining sectors exogenously, the CGE model is less 
successful at replicating the forecasted domestic value of oil production and the associated 
government revenue (that is, as shown earlier in Figure 2.1). Figure 3.1 shows the forecasted 
government oil revenue flows in domestic currency for the period 2007–46. However, in our 
simulation exercise government oil revenue is significantly lower than the forecasted revenue. This 
divergence is explained by the real exchange rate appreciation in the simulation, which lowers the oil 
revenue in domestic currency terms (official forecasts assume a fixed real exchange rate). If we adjust 
the simulated revenue flow for this real exchange rate appreciation or, alternatively, express revenue 
in US dollar terms, the revenue flows would look the same as the forecasted flows. The model, 
therefore, accurately replicates both production and revenue flows, but domestic revenue flows will be 
sensitive to the Dutch Disease effects of oil production and exportation. 
Figure 3.1—Forecasted and modeled government oil revenue flows, 2007–46 
 
Source: CGE model results based on optimistic extraction projection in Table A.1. 
Oil Simulation Experiments 
In all the oil simulations, oil production and refining capacity is increased and then gradually phased 
out to replicate the forecasted production path in Figure 2.1, which assumes peak production of about 
210,000 barrels of oil per day between 2017 and 2025. The main objective in this study is not to 
compare the contributions of alternative oil production and revenue scenarios to the economy, but 
instead to evaluate economic and socioeconomic outcomes under alternative spending options. All oil 
simulations therefore assume the same oil production path and government revenue stream, but they 
differ in terms of how government saves or spends the revenue. A total of eight oil scenarios are 
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Table 3.4—Summary of modeled baseline and oil scenarios 


















0. BASELINE`  Business as usual baseline scenario with  
no oil production and refining capacity 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Public investment scenarios with no productivity spillover         
1. FND00INV  Fund 00 investment scenario  100%  No  0%  No 
2. FND50INV  Fund 50 investment scenario  50%  No  50%  No 
3. FND00I&H  Fund 00 investment and household  
transfer scenario 
50%  No  0%  Uniform cash 
grant* 
Public investment scenarios with productivity spillover effects        
4. FND50NTR  Fund 50 investment scenario with neutral 
productivity spillover 
50%  Yes  50%  No 
 5. FND50AGR  Fund 50 investment scenario with  
agricultural productivity spillover 
50%  Yes  50%  No 
6. FND50NAG  Fund 50 investment scenario with 
nonagricultural productivity spillover 
50%  Yes  50%  No 
Alternative investment spending scenarios         
7. FND50O&M  Fund 50 investment scenario with neutral 
productivity spillover and additional 
operations and maintenance expenditures 




8. FND50FSB  Fund 50 investment scenario with neutral 
productivity spillover and additional fuel 
   
N/A  Yes  50%  Lower fuel-
tariff rate
# 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
Notes: (*) 50 percent of oil revenue distributed to citizens; (
+) additional operations and maintenance (O&M) expenditures 
are introduced into the model by increasing government consumption growth rate from 3 to 4 percent; (
#) tariff rate on fuel 
imports is reduced by 50 percent from about 80 to 40 percent. 
We start off with a set of basic investment scenarios where we assume all oil revenue is 
invested domestically, or, alternatively, part of oil revenue is invested and the balance is transferred to 
a foreign oil fund. Also included in this set of scenarios is one where part of the revenue is transferred 
to households in the form of a welfare grant. The first simulation, named FND00INV, is a typical 
Dutch Disease scenario. It assumes that all public revenue is immediately used to finance public 
infrastructure investment spending. This means none of the government oil revenue is saved abroad in 
a fund. In general, in this scenario, additional foreign exchange revenue from oil production and 
exportation increases national income, which is used by private and public agents for consumption 
(this is an endogenous effect) and investment (via increased private savings, or by design via the 
government closure selected). The latter increases the economy’s total capital stock until peak oil 
production is reached, but the increased public capital does not sustain significantly higher output 
over the entire simulation period, as the capital stock in the oil sector is subsequently reduced to 
replicate declining output as oil reserves are gradually depleted. The simulation therefore allows the 
pure demand-side effects of the price boom to be isolated: Absorptive capacity constraints are binding 
and the demand effects lead to a real appreciation and the typical restructuring of production observed 
during an oil boom. 
The second simulation, FND50INV, examines the case where only half of the oil revenue is 
invested immediately in public infrastructure while the remainder is deposited in a foreign oil fund. 
Government may choose this option in an attempt to mitigate or sterilize the Dutch Disease effects 
associated with a spend-all approach. Sterilization will reduce the growth effects relative to the 
experience of a massive spending boom, but at the same time the real exchange rate appreciation will 
be less pronounced since not all oil revenue from exports is brought back into the domestic economy.  
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Although this may benefit export sectors in the short run, the net effect in the long run is not certain 
since investment flows and capital stock formation is lower in this scenario. 
A third simulation, FND00I&H, investigates the option of using oil revenues to finance an 
unconditional uniform cash transfer scheme. This simulation assumes no deposit in a foreign oil fund; 
instead, half of oil revenue is spent on infrastructural investments (as in FND50INV) and the 
remainder is distributed equally among Uganda’s citizens. The cash transfer is modeled as a 
nonuniform income tax cut across all household groups. The extent of the tax break varies across 
household groups in the model such that each citizen, irrespective of his or her age, receives the same 
per capita transfer in absolute terms (that is, initial average income tax rates and the size of household 
groups are taken into account in the calculation of the applicable tax cuts). In relative terms, therefore, 
poorer citizens receive a much larger welfare transfer than wealthy citizens. Since average tax rates 
are low in Uganda, several household groups end up with a negative tax rate, which effectively means 
their earnings from welfare transfers exceed income tax payments. If such a uniform grant scheme 
ever became a reality in Uganda it could be justified on the basis that each citizen in Uganda is 
entitled to an equal share of oil revenue. The design of the transfer mechanism implies that household 
incomes will rise across the board by the same absolute magnitude, causing poverty rates to decline, 
but income inequality will remain virtually unchanged. In contrast to the earlier scenarios, this 
simulation will lead to an increase in private disposable income, which is used by households to 
increase consumption and savings. The latter, in turn, finances private investment formation. Low 
savings rates, however, suggest that most of the additional income will be spent on household 
consumption. 
Whereas the first set of oil simulations assume zero productivity spillover effects from public 
investments, the second set of simulations explore the importance of such productivity spillover. The 
aim here is to demonstrate not only the importance, in general, of ensuring that public investments are 
indeed productivity-enhancing, but also to show how investments that aim to raise productivity in 
specific sectors in the economy (for example, through direct targeting of agricultural or 
nonagricultural sectors) may ultimately have important growth and welfare or distributional 
implications. The scenarios all follow the same basic setup as FND50INV (that is, half of revenues are 
saved abroad and the other half is allocated to public infrastructure investments), but now assume that 
government infrastructure investment raises productivity relative to the growth already assumed in 
BASELINE. In FND50NTR the productivity-enhancing effect is uniform or neutral across sectors, 
whereas in FND50AGR and FND50NAG total factor productivity growth is biased in favor of 
agricultural/food-processing and nonagricultural sectors, respectively. 
The extent of the total factor productivity spillover effects in each sector is linked directly to 
the level of spending on each of several budget items. Equation (3) defines this relationship. Thus, as 




0 in relation 
to the sector production index Qs,t/Qs,0 raises (or reduces) sectoral total factor productivity As,t, with 
the extent of the increase (reduction) determined by the spillover parameter ρsg. In the first set of 
investment simulations ρsg was set to zero, whereas in the spillover simulations ρsg = 0.1. Since the 
structure of government spending is likely to have a bearing on sectoral productivity spillover effects 
(Fan, Mogues, and Benin 2009), FND50AGR and FND50NAG assume both an increase in total 
government investment spending (as in FND50INV) and also a change in the composition of that 
spending. Data on the current budget composition are obtained from Sennoga and Matovu (2010) and 
Twimukye et al. (2010). In FND50AGR we increase the allocation to agriculture by 20 percent (or 0.8 
percentage points) from 3.8 to 4.6 percent of total budgetary resources, while at the same the 
expenditure share to roads is reduced by 0.8 percentage points. In FND50NAG we assume the 
opposite, that is, the expenditure share on agriculture is reduced by 0.8 percent and vice versa for 
roads. Next, growth-expenditure elasticities (from Benin et al. 2008) are applied to calculate the 
marginal effect of the absolute and compositional shift in public expenditure sectoral productivity. 
The growth-expenditure elasticity for agricultural spending is 1.4, whereas it is 2.7 for roads. The 
result is that total factor productivities in agriculture and food-processing sectors increase by about 25 
percent in FND50AGR, while they decrease by about 10 percent in other manufacturing and trade and 
transport sectors (these changes are relative to the growth rate in BASELINE). The effects are the 
exact opposite in FND50NAG. In the neutral spending scenario (FND50NTR) there is no 
compositional shift in spending, hence productivity across all sectors grows by the same margin.  
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4.  MODEL RESULTS 
Public Investment Scenarios with No Productivity Spillover Effects 
Spending All Revenues on Infrastructure (FND00INV) 
The major effects and transmission channels of the oil boom in Uganda are described with reference 
to the results of scenario FND00INV, which serves as the benchmark for other oil scenarios. Public 
investment expenditures are linked directly to government oil revenue and will therefore increase until 
peak oil production is reached in 2017. Thereafter these expenditures gradually decline due to 
declining government oil revenues (which in turn is linked to the real exchange rate appreciation) and 
the gradual winding down of oil production activities (see Figure 3.1). The recursive-dynamic 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is set up so that public investments in the current period 
raise the total capital stock in the next period. In addition to these investments being assumed to have 
no productivity spillover effects (that is, total factor productivity growth is the same as in BASELINE), 
the declining investment levels after 2017 imply that the oil boom does not sustain significantly 
higher levels of output in the long run. 
Under FND00INV the Ugandan economy grows rapidly at 6.9 percent per year until 2017, 
mainly because of the large increase in real public-sector investment (see Table 4.1, Part A). Overall 
investment grows at 9.5 percent per year over this period. Household income also rises in these 
scenarios, which leads to an increase in private consumption (by 5.1 percent during 2007–17) and 
savings. However, private savings as a share of GDP actually declines (not reported in Table 4.1), 
which suggests the oil boom crowds out private-sector investment, at least in relative terms. A further 
factor is the real exchange rate appreciation. Although in general such an appreciation would mean 
imported capital goods become less expensive, capital formation in Uganda is in fact intensive in 
nontradable goods (for example, nontradable construction goods make up 78 percent of investments). 
This means that foreign capital inflows, which are assumed to grow at 3 percent annually in all 
scenarios, finance less and less real investment over time. Diminishing oil reserves means the real 
exchange rate appreciation weakens over time, but this is not sufficient to reverse the trend of 
declining non-oil exports. In fact, the initial welfare gains associated with the surge in public-sector 
investment weaken over time as other components of GDP (for example, private investments, 
consumption, and exports) fail to grow more rapidly when public investments eventually decline. 
A comparison of FND00INV with BASELINE reveals the typical characteristics of Dutch 
Disease. The consumer price index increases at an average annual rate of 1.2 percent during 2007–46, 
while the (trade-weighted) real exchange rate appreciates by 1.3 percent between 2007 and 2017 or by 
1.2 percent per year over the entire 2007–46 period. Relative to BASELINE, the spending of windfall 
revenues leads to a 0.2 and 1.5 percentage point contraction in agriculture and services, respectively, 
in the medium term (2007–17; see Table 4.1, Part B). These two sectors’ shares of GDP also decline 
dramatically by 4.6 and 16.4 percentage points relative to the base (2007–17; see Table 4.1, Part D). 
The services sector regains growth momentum in the long run, but agricultural growth only improves 
marginally relative to the base. Thus, while real GDP at factor cost increases, the agricultural sector 
actually suffers a decline in GDP, both absolutely (compared to BASELINE) during the oil expansion 
period and relative to other sectors over the oil extraction period (Table 4.1, Part B). The services 
sector also realizes absolute income losses in the medium term, but a reversal of fortunes sees this 
sector become the engine of long-term growth (Table 4.1, Part C). Of course, the observed structural 
shift is also a feature of the BASELINE scenario, and is, to a large extent, a natural outcome for any 
developing country’s growth path. 
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Table 4.1—GDP growth and sectoral composition: No productivity spillover scenarios during oil expansion period, 2007–17, and entire oil extraction 
period, 2007–46 
        No productivity oil scenarios 
  Initial value  BASELINE  FND00INV  FND50INV  FND00I&H 
  2007  2007–17  2007–46  2007–17  2007–46  2007–17  2007–46  2007–17  2007–46 
Part A: Annual growth rate of demand                   
  Absorption  26,584  4.2  4.7  5.8  5.2  5.1  5.0  5.7  4.9 
  Private consumption  18,743  4.5  5.0  5.1  5.5  4.8  5.3  5.7  5.3 
  Fixed investment  5,014  3.6  4.4  9.5  4.9  7.1  4.7  7.2  4.2 
  Government consumption  2,689  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0 
  Exports  3,697  6.9  7.0  12.7  7.8  14.0  7.4  12.7  7.3 
  Imports  -7,260  4.7  5.6  7.2  6.2  6.1  5.9  7.2  5.9 
  GDP at factor cost  21,318  4.5  5.1  6.9  5.6  6.8  5.3  6.8  5.3 
                             
  Real exchange rate
*     -0.5 (-5.2)  -0.9 (-30.7)  -1.3 (-12.4)  -1.2 (-37.5)  -0.8 (-7.7)  -1.1 (-34.4)  -1.6 (-15.2)  -1.1 (-34.5) 
  Consumer price index
*     0.5 (5.0)  0.9 (40.3)  1.2 (12.9)  1.2 (56.2)  0.7 (7.7)  1.0 (48.7)  1.6 (16.9)  1.0 (49.1) 
                         
Part B: Annual growth rate of supply                   
  Total GDP     4.5  5.1  6.9  5.6  6.8  5.3  6.8  5.3 
  Agriculture     3.9  4.1  3.7  4.2  3.8  4.1  3.9  4.2 
  Industry     3.7  4.4  12.7  5.0  12.0  4.8  12.1  4.5 
     Mining (including crude oil)     2.3  3.1  57.9  5.0  57.9  4.9  57.9  4.8 
  Services     5.2  5.7  3.7  6.2  4.3  6.0  4.0  5.9 
                         
Part C: Sector’s contribution to GDP growth                   
  Agriculture     19.0  14.6  10.5  12.2  10.8  13.2  11.4  13.8 
  Industry     21.8  20.8  66.4  21.5  61.3  21.3  62.5  19.9 
     Mining (including crude oil)     0.2  0.1  36.9  0.3  37.5  0.3  37.6  0.3 
  Services     59.3  64.6  23.2  66.2  27.9  65.5  26.0  66.3 
    100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
                         
Part D: Sector share of GDP by 2017 and 2046  (2007)  (2017)  (2046)  (2017)  (2046)  (2017)  (2046)  (2017)  (2046) 
  Agriculture  22.6  21.1  13.2  16.8  11.2  16.9  12.1  17.2  12.6 
  Industry  27.3  24.7  20.7  45.6  21.2  42.7  21.0  43.8  19.7 
     Mining (including crude oil)  0.4  0.3  0.1  17.6  0.2  17.7  0.2  17.7  0.2 
  Oil refining  −  −  −  1.3  > 0.1  1.3  0.0  1.3  0.0 
  Services  50.1  54.2  66.1  37.6  67.6  40.4  66.9  39.0  67.7 
  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
                         
Part E: Sources of growth                   
  Labor supply     0.71  0.71  0.76  0.71  0.76  0.71  0.76  0.71 
  Capital stock     1.59  1.95  1.98  2.44  1.83  2.23  1.82  2.12 
  Land supply     0.23  0.23  0.23  0.23  0.23  0.23  0.23  0.23 
  Factor productivity     1.97  2.15  4.00  2.24  4.05  2.20  4.03  2.18 
Source: CGE model results. 
Note: (*) Trade-weighted real exchange rate; overall growth rate in parentheses.  
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Table 4.2 presents more disaggregated sectoral production results (GDP at factor cost), 
focusing on changes during the oil expansion period (2007–17). The first column shows the average 
annual change in BASELINE, and the remaining columns show the percentage point changes in 
production in the various oil scenarios relative to BASELINE. The results for FND00INV corroborate 
the picture of Dutch Disease. Crude oil production expands tremendously, while less tradable 
subsectors in agriculture, industry, and services also expand production. Within agriculture, export-
oriented crops and other agriculture (which includes fisheries, a fairly significant exporter) suffer the 
greatest declines relative to the base, mainly due to the adverse real exchange rate effects on the trade 
competitiveness of these subsectors. The same is true for sectors such as fish processing and hotels 
and catering, both of which are highly export-oriented (see Table 3.3). 
Government spending patterns also determine different sectors’ relative performance under 
FND00INV. Increased government expenditure on investment goods leads to a sharp increase in 
demand for construction services (nontraded) and machinery (mostly imported) in particular. This in 
turn leads to an indirect increase in demand for intermediate input goods typically supplied by 
manufacturing and services sectors. Despite increased economic activity in nonagricultural sectors 
(that is, industry in particular), the knock-on effects for nontradable agricultural subsectors is almost 
negligible. 
The contraction of production under FND00INV is most pronounced in cotton; tobacco; 
flowers; coffee; and tea, cocoa, and vanilla, where most or all of total production is exported. These 
sectors do not benefit from higher prices as a result of increasing domestic demand but are negatively 
affected by higher factor costs and higher prices for intermediate inputs. The latter also holds true for 
import-competing cereals (maize, rice, other cereals), pulses (oilseeds and beans), and livestock. 
Though these sectors are more oriented toward the domestic market and therefore benefit from 
generally higher domestic income, demand elasticities are fairly low and the demand effect is not 
strong enough to compensate for the negative supply effect. Moreover, producers of maize, rice, other 
cereals, and oilseeds face competition from foreign suppliers. Given the high substitution possibilities 
for agricultural goods in domestic demand, the expansion of domestic demand is insufficient to 
counter the substitution effect. The assumption of zero productivity spillover effects in this scenario 
also explains the weak performance of nontradable agricultural subsectors. As later results show, 
these adverse effects can be offset by using oil revenues to raise agricultural productivity. The 
contraction of fisheries results from strong forward linkages to fish processing, a highly export-
oriented food-processing sector, which suffers from Dutch Disease effects. 
Only a select few agricultural subsectors (root crops, matooke, and horticultural crops) and 
forestry realize an increase in production in FND00INV relative to BASELINE. These benefit from 
increasing domestic private demand as a result of higher private income. In the former three sectors, 
private demand expansion is sufficiently strong to induce price increases, which overcompensate cost 
increases. Forestry is also a pure nontradable, and though not directly consumed, benefits from its 
forward linkages to the furniture industry, which is an investment-goods industry and therefore 
directly affected by increased public investment demand.    
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Table 4.2—Annual growth rate of sectoral production (GDP at factor cost): All scenarios during the oil expansion period, 2007–17 
  BASELINE 
(%) 
Percentage point deviation from BASELINE 
  FND00INV  FND50INV  FND00I&H  FND50NTR  FND50AGR  FND50NAG  FND50O&M  FND50FSB 
GDP  4.50  2.41  2.32  2.30  3.17  3.26  2.98  3.10  3.04 
Agriculture  3.88  -0.18  -0.11  0.02  0.93  1.32  0.44  0.87  0.85 
Cereals  3.56  -0.07  -0.02  -0.06  1.02  1.33  0.59  0.95  0.93 
Root crops  4.16  0.11  0.05  0.22  1.03  1.39  0.56  0.97  0.94 
Matooke  3.75  0.10  0.05  0.20  1.05  1.34  0.66  0.99  0.96 
Pulses  4.54  -0.03  -0.01  0.01  0.96  1.45  0.38  0.90  0.87 
Horticulture  4.10  0.16  0.07  0.30  1.05  1.35  0.64  0.99  0.97 
Export agriculture  4.49  -0.49  -0.14  -0.70  0.88  1.60  0.05  0.81  0.78 
Livestock  3.95  -0.07  -0.05  0.00  0.98  1.27  0.57  0.91  0.90 
Other agriculture  3.34  -0.50  -0.38  0.12  0.78  1.12  0.34  0.73  0.73 
Industry  3.72  9.00  8.26  8.33  8.80  8.84  8.68  8.67  8.62 
Mining  2.29  55.60  55.60  55.58  55.61  55.61  55.61  55.61  55.60 
    Crude oil  1.04  85.19  85.21  85.18  85.19  85.20  85.19  85.19  85.20 
Manufacturing  3.35  2.58  2.65  2.54  3.61  3.72  3.40  3.50  3.48 
    Food processing  4.20  -0.07  -0.05  0.35  1.03  1.25  0.74  0.96  0.95 
    Fish processing  0.68  -8.15  -4.56  -7.88  -1.93  -1.14  -2.91  -2.17  -2.09 
Nonfood manufacturing  2.40  5.13  5.22  4.71  6.10  6.12  5.95  5.96  5.93 
    Refined oil  1.04  85.19  85.21  85.18  85.19  85.20  85.19  85.19  85.20 
Other industry  3.89  4.03  2.40  2.62  3.24  3.28  3.05  2.99  2.90 
    Construction  3.67  5.06  3.02  3.14  3.80  3.85  3.62  3.51  3.40 
Services  5.17  -1.46  -0.89  -1.08  0.18  0.20  0.05  0.17  0.09 
Hotels and catering  13.37  -16.52  -8.63  -16.36  -6.02  -6.87  -5.45  -6.26  -6.53 
Public services  3.91  0.16  0.09  0.77  0.66  0.67  0.57  0.88  0.62 
                             
Source: CGE model results.    
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We next turn to welfare and household poverty results. The equivalent variation (EV) 
measures welfare improvements after controlling for price changes (see Table 4.3). Under BASELINE 
there is a marked improvement in the EV measure, with all household groups experiencing an 
increase in EV of between 4.8 and 5 percent on average per year over the 2007–46 period (or 520 to 
575 percent on aggregate). Gains are also fairly equally distributed, with rural farm households 
gaining slightly more thanks to a relatively rapid agricultural productivity growth rate assumed in 
BASELINE. Sustained GDP growth of just over 5 percent per year will virtually eliminate poverty by 
2046 (Table 4.4); the national poverty headcount (P0) drops to about 3.5 percent from 31.1 percent in 
the base. Similar rates of decline are observed for the depth of poverty measure (P1). 
The introduction of oil (FND00INV) sees more rapid improvements in EV for higher income 
urban and nonfarm households than for rural farming households. This relates to oil production, 
construction, and nonfood manufacturing being more capital and skilled-labor intensive, which means 
increases in factor returns in these sectors tend to benefit higher income and urban households. Self-
employed family labor in the agricultural sector is furthermore assumed to remain in the agricultural 
sector, which means farm households do not benefit much from increasing labor demand and higher 
wages in nonagricultural sectors, yet they face the same consumer price increases as all other 
households in the economy. The uneven distributional outcomes under FND00INV are also reflected 
in poverty outcomes. Although the oil boom leads to a larger overall reduction in poverty relative to 
BASELINE, urban poverty declines faster than rural poverty. For example, by 2017 rural poverty is 
22.6 percent in FND00INV, an 8.8 percent drop from the BASELINE rate of 24.8 percent. In contrast, 
the urban poverty rate is 16.1 percent lower by in FND00INV relative to BASELINE by 2017. 
Summing up, channeling windfall oil revenue into the Ugandan economy poses a number of 
challenges. The first one is the likely appreciation of the real exchange rate—the increase in the price 
of nontradable goods and services, in particular construction—as demand for them increases with 
windfall revenue in the face of a limited supply response, and its corollary in terms of lost export 
competitiveness in agriculture and food processing. The second one is the likely drop in overall 
productivity, as more factors get concentrated in nontradable sectors where potential productivity 
gains are much scarcer. Larger potential productivity gains in tradable sectors are theoretically 
justified by the possibility to exploit greater gains in specialization and larger economies of scale, 
greater access to knowledge and know-how, and higher competitive pressure both from competing 
importers on domestic markets and competing exporters on international markets. There is consistent 
empirical evidence to suggest that productivity gains are higher in tradable sectors than in nontradable 
sectors (Ito, Isard, and Symansky 1997; de Gregorio, Giovannini, and Wolf 1994; Baldi and Mulder 
2004; Egert et al. 2003). The third one is the existence of reallocation (investments, migrations) and 
transition costs (lost markets and know-how), which can make temporary specialization costly overall 
if the society has to return to its previous specialization patterns. This risk exists with oil in Uganda, 
given its exhaustible nature, the shape of the likely extraction path, and the possibility that it conducts 
to an untenable pattern of specialization if government oil revenues are immediately invested and 
public investments do not confer any spillovers on private-sector productivity. 
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Table 4.3—Equivalent variation results: No productivity spillover scenarios, 2007–46 
  Initial expenditure 
per capita (USh, 
thousands) 
BASELINE growth in  
equivalent variation   
(%) 
Percentage point deviation from BASELINE 
   FND00INV  FND50INV  FND00I&H 
   (2007)  2007–17  2007–46  2007–17  2007–46  2007–17  2007–46  2007–17  2007–46 
Rural farm  342  56.0  557.8  6.9  109.4  3.1  58.9  24.4  75.4 
Rural nonfarm  135  54.9  563.0  9.3  122.9  4.0  65.9  13.6  56.5 
Kampala metro  1,277  55.4  579.2  9.3  139.8  4.4  74.6  10.0  56.5 
Urban farm  1,100  50.3  520.9  9.0  126.2  4.6  67.5  17.0  63.5 
Urban nonfarm  1,249  55.0  575.2  9.6  137.2  4.4  73.3  12.4  59.4 
Average  820  54.3  559.2  8.8  127.1  4.1  68.0  15.5  62.2 
Source: CGE model results. 
Table 4.4—Poverty rate and depth of poverty: No productivity spillover scenarios, 2007–46 
   Initial  
poverty  
2007  
BASELINE   FND00INV  FND50INV  FND00I&H 
   2017  2026  2046  2017  2026  2046  2017  2026  2046  2017  2026  2046 
Headcount poverty 
(P0)                                
National  31.1  22.6  15.4  3.5  20.5  10.7  1.9  21.7  12.5  2.5  16.2  10.8  2.4 
Rural  34.3  24.8  16.9  3.9  22.6  11.9  2.2  23.9  13.8  2.8  17.7  11.8  2.6 
Urban  13.8  10.2  7.0  1.4  8.5  4.3  0.6  9.4  5.6  0.9  8.0  5.3  0.9 
Depth of poverty (P1)                           
National  8.8  5.9  3.7  0.7  5.2  2.3  0.3  5.6  2.9  0.4  4.0  2.4  0.4 
Rural  9.8  6.6  4.1  0.7  5.7  2.6  0.3  6.2  3.2  0.5  4.4  2.6  0.5 
Urban  3.7  2.6  1.6  0.3  2.2  0.9  0.2  2.4  1.2  0.2  1.9  1.0  0.2 
Source: CGE model results 
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Transferring Oil Revenues to a Foreign Oil Fund (FND50INV) 
In the face of severe Dutch Disease effects, Uganda could consider fixing the share of oil revenue to 
be transferred to the budget and investing the remainder abroad. The impact of such a sterilization 
strategy is analyzed in scenario FND50INV, which assumes that only half of current oil revenue is 
used to finance public infrastructure investment while the other half is saved in an oil fund abroad. 
This fund is assumed to be some variant of a permanent income fund (PIF) from which no 
withdrawals are made during the simulation period. Since none of the invested oil funds make their 
way back into the economy over the simulation period, we do not explicitly account for interest 
earned when calculating the cumulative fund value. However, with the nominal exchange rate as 
numéraire in the model all deposits into the fund are real values; hence, the fund also does not 
depreciate in value. Figure 4.1 shows the cumulative fund value for FND50INV. As a share of GDP 
the fund reaches more than 50 percent of GDP by about 2030. After this the fund as a share of GDP 
declines as no additional oil revenues are deposited into the fund but GDP continues to grow 
exponentially. 
Figure 4.1—Cumulative fund values when half of oil revenue is saved (FND50INV), 2010–46 
 
Source: CGE model results. 
Sterilizing part of the oil revenue and reducing government investment spending leads to less 
overall investment, less capital accumulation, and lower private consumption and absorption in the 
medium term (2007–17). This causes GDP growth to decline marginally in FND50INV compared to 
FND00INV, although growth still exceeds that observed in BASELINE (Table 4.1, Part A). Capital 
outflows (that is, deposits into the oil fund) cause a much smaller real exchange rate appreciation in 
FND50INV, which means the restructuring of supply from trade-oriented sectors with relatively 
higher total factor productivity growth (for example, agriculture and certain services sectors) toward 
domestic-market-oriented industrial sectors with lower total factor productivities is less pronounced. 
This relative productivity gain coupled with the improved export performance almost entirely makes 
up for the GDP loss associated with the 50 percent reduction in oil funds invested and the lower level 
of capital accumulation, at least in the medium term (see Table 4.1, Part E). In the long run, however, 
total factor productivity effects in FND50INV are insufficient to compensate for the lower levels of 
capital accumulation, with overall GDP growth now deviating more from that in the previous 
scenario. At the 3 percent real government consumption growth rate imposed in all these scenarios the 
adjustment cost falls on private households, with private consumption growing by only 0.2 and 0.3 
percentage points more than in BASELINE during 2007–17 and 2007–46, respectively, compared to 
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Tradable and nontradable agricultural subsectors are affected differently by the sterilization of 
oil revenues. Relative to FND00INV, the lower real appreciation improves the competitiveness of 
export-oriented and import-competing agricultural subsectors. In both types of subsectors, lower costs 
for nontradable intermediate inputs improve these sectors’ domestic terms of trade. In addition, lower 
price increases on domestic markets, due to less expansion of private domestic consumption, imply 
that the spread between domestic prices and import and export prices is less pronounced. Thus, on the 
supply-side, the extent of export reduction is lower in all export-oriented subsectors, whereas on the 
demand-side, part of the substitution of domestic supply by imports is avoided. Both types of 
adjustments—export penetration and import substitution—benefit agricultural producers of export 
crops and agricultural import substitutes. As a result, the contraction of production in these sectors is 
less pronounced in FND50INV compared to FND00INV (see Table 4.2). In contrast, agricultural 
nontradable goods, such as root crops, matooke, and horticulture, are negatively affected by lower 
private consumer demand, the latter being the result of lower overall income in the Ugandan economy 
compared to the full spending scenario. 
The welfare (EV) results for FND50INV in Table 4.3 indicate that, while all households suffer 
from welfare losses as a result of sterilization, nonfarm households in Kampala and other urban areas 
will lose out most from the resultant lower levels of public investment. There are two reasons for this 
result: First, the positive income effect of a higher capital rental rate (for now scarcer capital) is more 
than offset by lower capital availability; second, wage increases for skilled labor, which is another 
primary source of income for urban households, are also lower compared to FND00INV. The rate of 
poverty reduction is also lower in all household groups if part of the oil revenue is sterilized (Table 
4.4). Thus, while sterilization counters Dutch Disease and possibly allows future generations to 
benefit from increased spending of oil revenues that are saved now, it also means that fewer benefits 
are transferred to citizens in the medium term. 
Transferring Rents to Citizens (FND00I&H) 
We next consider a scenario where poverty is targeted directly by redistributing part of oil revenues 
directly to citizens rather than saving funds in an external oil fund. As a variation of FND00INV, 
FND00I&H evaluates the option of investing half of oil revenue in infrastructure while the other half 
is distributed to citizens as a direct welfare transfer. Each citizen receives the exact same per capita 
transfer. Households use this windfall to finance additional consumption spending or to save, 
depending on the average savings propensities specified for different household groups in the CGE 
model. The grant being uniformly distributed implies that poorer households receive a larger relative 
transfer. Figure 4.2 shows the impact of the welfare grant on average per capita income in 2017 when 
peak production is reached and the transfer value is at a maximum. 
Figure 4.2—Average per capita income and per capita transfer values (FND00I&H), 2017 
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The figure shows that prior to receiving the welfare grant, rural farm households have a per 
capita income of USh900,000 per year in 2017 (approximately $375, or just more than $1 per person 
per day). The welfare transfer, modeled as a tax rebate, adds a further USh129,000 to their income 
($50–60 per person per year); thus, as a share of income the transfer is worth 14.4 percent to these 
households. At the other end of the income spectrum are citizens of Kampala with a per capita income 
of USh5.4 million. To these people the transfer of USh129,000 is worth only 2.4 percent of their 
income. About three-quarters of Ugandans live in rural farm households; hence, the national average 
per capita income is only slightly above that of rural farm households (USh1.4 million), whereas the 
transfer is worth 9 percent of income. 
Despite price increases, the expansion of private household consumption benefits the 
agricultural sector as a whole, with overall agricultural GDP growth in FND00I&H marginally higher 
than in BASELINE (agricultural growth declined relative to BASELINE in both FND00INV and 
FND50INV). However, the real exchange rate appreciation accompanying the expansion of private 
consumption induces structural changes both across and within agricultural subsectors in terms of 
production for the domestic and world markets (see Table 4.2). In particular, the expansion of private 
consumption benefits producers of nontradable agricultural goods such as root crops, matooke, 
horticulture, livestock, and forestry. Export agriculture is now even more negatively affected 
compared to FND50INV due to production cost increases and a stronger real exchange rate. Similarly, 
import-competing agricultural subsectors, such as cereals and oilseeds, also contract as a result of 
production cost increases and stronger competition from abroad. In all these subsectors, the demand 
effect from increased private consumption is not sufficiently strong to compensate for the negative 
import substitution effect that results from the real exchange rate appreciation. With relatively 
inelastic demand and strong substitution possibilities between domestic and imported agricultural 
foodcrops, the substitution effect overcompensates the demand effect. 
Compared to the first two experiments, the redistribution of rents creates more employment 
opportunities in agriculture and leads to significantly higher land rentals and prices for livestock. 
Thus, a larger share of factor income accrues to rural households, who in turn spend a larger share of 
their incomes on goods produced domestically and in rural areas. This is corroborated by changes in 
the EV presented in Table 4.3. These results indicate that welfare improves more rapidly for lower 
income rural and urban farm households than for higher income nonfarm households. Of course, this 
result also stems directly from the welfare transfer itself, which in relative terms causes incomes of 
poorer households to increase more than that of wealthier households (Figure 4.2). Moreover, the 
redistribution of oil rents leads to more consumption by all households, and since production of 
consumption goods (agricultural and food products in particular) is more land and unskilled-labor 
intensive, the resulting increases in these factor returns benefit lower income and rural households 
more. 
The uneven distributional impacts are also reflected in poverty outcomes (Table 4.4). 
Between 2007 and 2017 the redistribution of oil rents leads to a significant decline in poverty at the 
national level, and also relative to BASELINE and the first two oil production scenarios. Moreover, 
rural poverty declines more rapidly than urban poverty. In fact, redistribution is twice as effective at 
reducing poverty among rural households compared to other rent spending options considered. By 
2046, however, poverty outcomes under FND00INV are superior to those under FND00I&H. This 
suggests that investments have longer lasting benefits in terms of production capacity and 
employment in the future. This benefits the poor more in the longer term than welfare handouts in the 
medium term. Of course, there are several caveats, one of which is the fact that we assume 
households’ expenditure patterns remain unchanged after receiving welfare transfers. In reality, 
households may choose to invest extra income earned in (say) education, which will raise their 
productivity and future employability. We also do not consider productivity spillover effects of the 
investments themselves, which is the focus of the next set of experiments. 
Public Investment Scenarios with Productivity Spillover Effects 
In this set of simulations we once again model an increase in public investments, now assuming that 
these investments have productivity spillover effects in the private sector. All scenarios use 
FND50INV as the basis, with productivity spillover effects determined by both the level of investment  
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spending and its structure. The first simulation, FND50NTR, assumes a neutral allocation of public 
investment spending. This assumes increased spending has a uniform productivity-enhancing effect 
across all sectors of the economy, that is, total factor productivity in all sectors grow by the same 
margin, in percentage terms, over and above the growth already defined in BASELINE. In the second 
simulation (FND50AGR) we model the effect of agricultural-biased public investment spending. This 
means spending is targeted toward improving agricultural productivity relative to nonagricultural 
productivity through investing relatively more in (for example) rural and agricultural infrastructure. In 
this scenario the productivity effects of government infrastructure are restricted to agricultural value-
added chains (agricultural sectors and food-processing sectors) and core agricultural inputs, such as 
communications, banking, and real estate services (this serves to alleviate possible supply constraints 
in input markets). Finally, FND50NAG investigates a restructuring of public investment expenditures 
toward urban infrastructure at the expense of agriculture-related infrastructure. 
In the discussion of results it is important to note that the three scenarios are not necessarily 
directly comparable as far as overall performance of the economy is concerned. Although a formulaic 
approach is adopted for determining the productivity shock associated with a certain level and 
structure of public investment, we do not consider the efficiency of such public spending across 
different sectors. In reality, cross-sectoral differences in initial productivity rates and productivity 
growth potential imply that the cost of achieving (say) a 1 percent increase in productivity may differ 
from one subsector to the next. What we can (and indeed do) compare are structural differences 
between the different scenarios. We also compare economic performance in the three productivity 
spillover scenarios to the no productivity spillover scenario (FND50INV). 
Table 4.5 presents the macroeconomic results. Here we only focus on the 2007–26 period, 
which includes the run-up to peak oil production as well as the decade during which peak production 
levels are sustained. All three productivity spillover scenarios assume the same increase in public 
infrastructural investments as in FND50INV. Initially, as public infrastructural investments rise in line 
with oil revenue increases, the productivity spillover scenarios are exactly the same as FND50INV. It 
is only by 2020 that we assume the productivity spillovers take effect (that is, we allow for a three-
year lag from the time public investments peak in 2017 until a higher level of productivity growth is 
reached). At this point we observe a fairly substantial additional GDP growth impact in all three 
scenarios relative to FND50INV, such that growth over the 2007–26 period exceeds growth in 
FND50INV by between 0.3 and 0.6 percentage points across the three productivity spillover scenarios. 
Even though the same level of oil-funded public investment is assumed in all these scenarios, the 
increased economic activity means that there is a marked rise in total annual investment as private 
savings increase. 
Real exchange rate and price impacts differ substantially across the three scenarios. Although 
the real exchange rate appreciates in all these scenarios, it depreciates relative to BASELINE, and in 
FND50NTR and FND50AGR the real exchange also depreciates relative to FND50INV. In contrast, 
the real exchange rate in FND50NAG is virtually unchanged from what was observed in BASELINE 
and FND50INV. The combined effect of increased productivity and more favorable terms of trade in 
at least two of the scenarios mean that export volumes increase in all three productivity spillover 
scenarios. This is illustrated by the improved performance of sectors such as export-oriented 
agriculture, livestock, other agriculture, and food processing, all of which grow relative to the decline 
in GDP observed in FND50INV (see Table 4.2). Other major exporters such as fish processing and 
hotels and catering show a relative improvement compared to FND50INV. 
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Table 4.5—GDP growth and sectoral composition: Productivity spillover scenarios during oil expansion and peak production period, 2007–26 
 





No productivity spillover 
2007–26 
  With productivity spillover 
(2007–26)    Productivity spillover variations 
(2007–26) 
  BASELINE  FND50INV    FND50NTR  FND50AGR  FND50NAG    FND50O&M  FND50FSB 
Part A: Annual growth rate of demand                     
  Absorption  26,584  4.3  4.9    5.4  5.5  5.2    5.3  5.3 
  Private consumption  18,743  4.7  5.1    5.6  5.7  5.4    5.5  5.6 
  Fixed investment  5,014  3.8  5.3    5.9  6.0  5.7    5.4  5.6 
  Government consumption  2,689  3.0  3.0    3.0  3.0  3.0    3.8  3.0 
  Exports  3,697  6.9  9.4    9.7  9.7  9.7    9.5  9.6 
  Imports  -7,260  5.0  5.8    6.1  6.1  6.1    6.0  6.0 
  GDP at factor cost  21,318  4.7  5.7    6.2  6.3  6.0    6.1  6.1 
  Real exchange rate
*     -0.9 (-12.1)  -0.9 (-15.6)     -0.6 (-11.0)  -0.4 (-7.1)  -0.9 (-15.5)     -0.6 (-11.5)  -0.6 (-10.5) 
  Consumer price index
*     0.6 (13.8)  0.8 (18.5)     0.6 (12.4)  0.4 (7.2)  0.9 (18.5)     0.6 (12.6)  0.6 (11.1) 
Part B: Annual growth rate of supply                     
  Total GDP     4.7  5.7     6.2  6.3  6.0     6.1  6.1 
  Agriculture     4.0  4.0     4.6  5.1  4.1     4.5  4.6 
  Industry     3.9  7.2     7.7  7.7  7.5     7.4  7.5 
     Mining (including crude oil)     2.5  26.5     26.5  26.6  26.5     26.5  26.5 
  Services     5.3  5.5     6.0  5.9  5.9     5.9  5.8 
Part C: Sector’s contribution to GDP 
growth       
 
     
 
   
  Agriculture     18.0  13.4     14.4  16.2  12.6     14.5  14.5 
  Industry     21.3  39.5     38.9  38.5  39.5     38.4  38.8 
     Mining (including crude oil)     0.2  16.9     14.9  14.5  15.7     15.4  15.3 
  Services     60.7  47.0     46.7  45.3  47.9     47.1  46.7 
    100.0  100.0    100.0  100.0  100.0    100.0  100.0 
Part D: Sector share of GDP by 2026                     
  Agriculture  22.6  19.9  16.6     17.0  18.2  15.9     17.1  17.2 
  Industry  27.3  23.8  35.3     35.2  35.0  35.5     34.8  35.1 
     Mining (including crude oil)  0.4  0.2  11.2     10.2  10.1  10.6     10.5  10.5 
  Oil refining  50.1  56.2  48.1     47.8  46.8  48.6     48.1  47.8 
  Services  22.6  19.9  16.6     17.0  18.2  15.9     17.1  17.2 
  100.0  100.0  100.0    100.0  100.0  100.0    100.0  100.0 
Part E: Sources of growth                     
  Labor supply     0.7  0.73     0.73  0.73  0.73     0.73  0.73 
  Capital stock     1.7  2.10     2.24  2.25  2.20     2.16  2.16 
  Land supply     0.2  0.23     0.23  0.23  0.23     0.23  0.23 
  Factor productivity     2.0  2.65     3.02  3.11  2.85     2.95  2.98 
Source: CGE model results. 
Note: (*) Trade-weighted real exchange rate; overall growth rate in parentheses. 
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We have previously established that public investment spending in an oil production context 
and the assumption of no productivity spillovers tends to benefit urban nonfarm households more than 
rural farm households, since the latter group is largely bypassed as a result of missing backward 
linkages from rapidly growing industrial and services sectors. The productivity spillover scenarios 
now suggest a rapid improvement in the outcomes for rural farm households. All households still 
enjoy increases in welfare (EV) over time if public investment spending does not discriminate 
between sectors (FND50NTR), but, interestingly, the absolute and proportionate gains are now highest 
for rural farm households (Table 4.6). These altered distributional impacts are also reflected in the 
poverty results (Table 4.7), which show that rural poverty declines slightly faster than urban poverty. 
This relates to the Ugandan economy’s ability to produce more tradable and nontradable goods as a 
result of productivity increases, whereas the reversal of the real exchange rate appreciation shifts the 
domestic terms of trade in favor of export-oriented and import-competing producers of tradable goods 
and against producers of nontradable goods. All agricultural sectors now expand their production, 
whereas export-oriented agricultural sectors increase their export supply. Thus, although many 
agricultural sectors shrank when public investments were unproductive (for example, in FND50INV), 
the sector is able to expand as a result of productivity spillovers, even when not targeted directly as is 
the case in FND50NTR. 
Table 4.6—Equivalent variation results: Productivity spillover scenarios, 2007–26 










Percentage point deviation from FND50INV (2007–26) 
 
With productivity  
spillover    Productivity spillover 
variations 











Rural farm  342  155.2  26.7  35.2  13.2     18.4  23.4 
Rural 
nonfarm  135  156.0  22.9  28.6  12.3    17.2  21.1 
Kampala 
metro  1,277  159.9  24.4  29.8  13.8    17.6  20.2 
Urban farm  1,100  145.7  21.4  27.2  11.0    19.5  19.8 
Urban 
nonfarm  1,249  158.6  23.3  28.3  13.0     17.5  19.6 
Average  820  155.1  23.7  29.8  12.7     18.0  20.8 
Source: CGE model results. 







  With 
productivity 
spillover 
















   2007  2017  2026  2017  2026  2017  2026  2017  2026  2017  2026  2017  2026 
Headcount poverty 
(P0)                          
National  31.1  21.7  12.5  17.3  9.7  16.6  8.9  18.4  11.0  17.7  10.6  17.3  10.1 
Rural  34.3  23.9  13.8  19.0  10.7  18.2  9.9  20.3  12.1  19.5  11.7  19.0  11.1 
Urban  13.8  9.4  5.6  7.7  4.1  7.7  3.8  8.0  4.9  7.8  4.4  7.8  4.2 
Depth of poverty 
(P1)      
 
         
 
     
National  8.8  5.6  2.9  4.2  2.1  4.0  1.9  4.5  2.4  4.3  2.3  4.2  2.1 
Rural  9.8  6.2  3.2  4.6  2.3  4.4  2.1  5.0  2.7  4.7  2.5  4.6  2.4 
Urban  3.7  2.4  1.2  1.8  0.8  1.8  0.8  1.9  1.0  1.8  0.9  1.8  0.9 
Source: CGE model results. 
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In the case where nonagricultural sectors are targeted (FND50NAG), additional public 
investment spending on urban road infrastructure increases total factor productivity growth in the 
tradable nonfood-manufacturing sectors (that is, textiles, wood and paper, other manufacturing, 
machinery, and furniture) and in the trade, hotel and catering, and transport services sectors. At the 
same time we assume lower levels of spending on rural infrastructure, which reduces total factor 
productivity growth in all agricultural and food-processing sectors as well as in the less-tradable 
communications, banking, real estate, and community services sectors. As expected, when 
productivity growth is lower in sectors that predominantly supply goods for the domestic market 
(these are also goods that cannot easily be substituted by imports), the spending of oil revenues causes 
a larger (relative) appreciation of the real exchange rate than in the case of neutral productivity 
spillovers. Hence, although the manufacturing export performance is slightly stronger in machinery 
and equipment, hotels and catering, and transport, the agricultural sector is hit relatively hard when 
productivity gains are biased against it. At 4.1 percent per year, average agricultural growth in 
FND50NAG is half a percentage point lower than in FND50NTR, and the agricultural sector’s share in 
GDP declines by more than a percentage point by 2026 vis-à-vis a neutral allocation of investment 
spending. 
When public investment spending is biased in favor of agriculture and food processing 
(FND50AGR), outcomes are markedly different. Increased supply of agricultural goods and food 
items is sufficiently strong to more than offset the demand effects of the oil boom, such that the initial 
real exchange rate appreciation observed in FND50INV is reversed within a relatively short time. The 
effects on exports are a mirror image of those in FND50NAG; agriculture exports recover more 
strongly than in the former experiment, but lower productivity growth in nonfood manufacturing 
results in a more sluggish recovery in manufacturing exports. 
The most striking difference between the two public investment options, though, is the effect 
on real household disposable incomes, welfare (Table 4.6) and poverty (Table 4.7). Compared to 
FND50NTR, a manufacturing bias (FND50NAG) sharply moderates real income and welfare growth 
in the economy. The total rise in EV relative to FND50INV is only 12.7 percentage points in 
FND50NAG compared to 23.7 percentage points in FND50NTR. Moreover, the income gain is spread 
somewhat unevenly across household groups, with rural farm households now faring worse than 
Kampala households. This contrasts sharply with the outcome under FND50AGR, which generates 
markedly higher aggregate real income gains in the medium term (29.8 percentage points), and one 
that benefits poorer rural households more. Poverty outcomes for rural and urban households improve 
in the agricultural-biased scenario relative to the neutral scenario, whereas in the manufacturing-
biased scenario poverty rates are higher compared to the neutral growth scenario. In all productivity 
scenarios, however, poverty rates decline more rapidly than in FND50INV. 
Given the significant impact on agricultural growth and on the welfare of rural households of 
the agricultural productivity spillovers from the increased public investments arising from Uganda’s 
oil revenue, it is critical that the Government of Uganda put in place mechanisms by which these 
productivity spillovers can be maximized. What is needed, in particular, is a well-coordinated set of 
interventions aimed at improving competitiveness in the agricultural sector, which would serve as a 
platform sustainable growth in the economy. However, at 3.8 percent of the budget, current spending 
on agriculture in Uganda is well below the 10 percent target committed to under the Comprehensive 
African Agricultural Development Program (CAADP). Research by Fan, Mogues, and Benin (2009) 
suggests that agricultural research and development, infrastructure (such as rural roads), and 
investments in education and skills have the highest payoffs in terms of agricultural productivity gains 
and increased competitiveness of the sector. 
Variations on Productivity-Enhancing Investment Spending Scenarios 
The final two simulations both use the assumptions underlying FND50NTR as a starting point, and 
then introduce slight variations to the way these simulations are set up. In the first, FND50O&M, we 
assume that increased public capital stock would also require a higher level of operations and 
maintenance (O&M) expenditure; hence, in this scenario, the growth rate of real government 
consumption is raised from 3 to 3.8 percent. O&M costs are financed through oil revenues, thereby 
reducing investment spending and lowering the extent of productivity spillovers seen in FND50NTR.  
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In the second scenario (FND50FSB) we assume the Ugandan government introduces a fuel subsidy 
(FSB) equivalent to a 50 percent reduction in fuel-import tariffs on fuel (this tariff is 80 percent in the 
base). As in the previous scenario the cost of the FSB is recovered from oil revenues. 
Additional O&M expenditure has fairly strong adverse effects on the economy. The 
opportunity costs of having oil revenues but then spending them on current expenditure rather than 
investments are high (Table 4.5). Fixed investments decline by half a percentage point relative to 
FND50NTR, which ultimately causes GDP growth to weaken as the rate of capital formation slows 
down. Households realize significant welfare losses relative to FND50NTR (Table 4.6). Urban 
households are less affected, mainly because an expansion of government consumption essentially 
implies an enlargement of public administration, a sector that employs a large number of skilled urban 
workers. However, the increase in skilled wages is not enough to compensate for higher prices that 
result from the real exchange rate appreciation and the overall decline in economic activity. Rural 
farm households are adversely affected in two ways: They are isolated from the direct demand effects 
of higher government consumption and their competitiveness suffers as a result of the Dutch Disease 
associated with the real exchange rate appreciation. 
A reduction of fuel-import tariffs, as in FND50FSB, holds important benefits for fuel- or 
energy-intensive industries and households that spend a large portion of their budgets on fuel or 
transport. Lower fuel-import tariffs in general also reduce deadweight costs of taxation, provided the 
quality of tax administration does not decline at the same time. A low-taxation environment could 
further encourage private investment in the non-oil economy (both in agriculture and industry), which, 
if successful, would allow the economy to continue diversifying rather than concentrating too many 
resources in the oil sector. This may also compensate for the adverse effect on profitability of the real 
exchange rate appreciation. 
Yet, given the low private marginal propensities to save in Uganda, which range from 8 
percent for rural farm households to 9.8 percent for Kampala households (in the Uganda social 
accounting matrix [SAM] for 2007), most of the additional factor income that results from lower 
tariffs will be spent on private consumption. Moreover, since the real government expenditure growth 
is once again fixed at 3 percent per year in this scenario, lower tariff revenues reduce public 
investment spending and lower the extent of productivity spillovers. Thus, the macro effects are 
similar to what was observed in FND50O&M. The redistribution of income between the public and 
the private sector leads to a slight restructuring of final demand from government to private 
consumption (Table 4.5). Moreover, the intermediate input cost reductions that result from lower fuel 
prices are not strong enough to compensate for sectoral productivity losses and cost reductions are 
almost identical across sectors. As a result, under the FND50FSB scenario, all sectors experience real 
income losses compared to FND50NTR during the boom period until 2017, and these are slightly 
higher than in FND50O&M (Table 4.2). As in scenario FND50O&M, the costs of having oil revenue 
but then using it for consumption expenditures are high. Although energy-intensive agricultural 
sectors such as other cereals, vegetables, and fruits and tree crops benefit directly from lower fuel 
costs or indirectly from lower transport costs, these cost reductions are insufficient to compensate 
negative demand effects that result from low-income elasticities of private consumption demand. 
As shown in Table 4.6, although the 50 percent reduction in tariff rates on fuel would lower 
overall welfare compared to FND50NTR, the welfare losses would be distributed progressively with 
rural households and urban farm households being relatively less negatively affected by productivity 
losses and benefiting relatively more from lower energy costs. This also implies that the increases in 
poverty rates are insignificantly low (Table 4.5).  
36 
5.  CONCLUSION 
Even at conservative prices of $70–80 per barrel, future oil revenue in Uganda will be considerable, 
potentially doubling government revenue within 6 to 10 years and constituting an estimated 10–15 
percent of GDP at peak production. The economic impact of oil production on the country’s 
agricultural performance and the livelihood of rural households could be profound, particularly during 
the first phase of the projected extraction when massive additional inflows of foreign exchange need 
to be managed by the Ugandan government. The so-called Dutch Disease effects may affect the 
international competitiveness of export sectors, such as agriculture in particular, and it is likely to 
make the country’s growth strategy—with its emphasis on value-added, export diversification, and 
manufacturing—harder to achieve. This would threaten to increase, rather than decrease, the urban–
rural income gap. 
Agriculture and related processing currently contribute about 27 percent to GDP. Food and 
agriculture-related processing make up about 50 percent of household consumption expenditure. 
Poverty is higher in rural than in urban households and within rural households it is highest among 
nonfarm households. Even with no oil revenue, agriculture’s share of GDP is projected to decrease by 
6.8 percentage points from 22.6 percent in 2007 to 15.8 percent over the next 40 years, as increasing 
factor productivities in tradable sectors and increasing per capita income and consumption will be 
leading toward a restructuring of production in favor of services. 
The spending of oil revenues results in a further relative contraction of agriculture, with the 
extent depending on spending options—consumption versus capital investment, domestic capital 
investment versus investment in a foreign oil fund, unproductive versus productive capital investment 
and infrastructure development, government consumption versus redistribution to citizens (private 
consumption and investment), or revising tax versus trade policies. 
It is important to differentiate between medium- and long-term impacts of oil revenue 
spending, since structural impacts differ and asymmetric adjustment flexibilities (ratchet effects) in 
factor markets (investments, migrations) and foreign trade (lost markets and know-how) can make 
temporary specialization costly if the Ugandan society has to return to its previous specialization 
patterns because of the exhaustible nature of oil reserves. 
The impacts of oil extraction will be felt by Uganda mostly indirectly through higher 
government expenditures on consumption (largely administration) and investment; direct effects 
through higher domestic factor income in oil extraction and refining and through backward linkages 
will be minimal given production technologies and the economic enclave character of the oil industry. 
Results of this discussion paper suggest that the extraction and refining of oil will increase overall 
GDP growth, increase national and rural real household incomes, and benefit the poor in Uganda. In 
the medium term, that is, from the starting of oil extraction (2011 in this analysis) until reaching peak 
production (2017), overall average annual GDP growth will be between 2.3 and 3.3 percentage points 
higher than in a comparable baseline projection without oil. In the long term over the total extraction 
path of 40 years, the average growth rate will be between 0.2 and 0.5 percentage points higher. The 
differences depend on how oil revenues are spent, on whether public infrastructure confers any 
spillovers on private-sector productivity, and in which sectors these spillovers occur. 
Several conclusions emerge from the simulations presented in this paper. First, with the 
projected oil extraction path and recently high oil prices, a real appreciation of the Uganda shilling is 
almost inevitable. Although policies designed to limit absorption through tight fiscal and monetary 
policies would reduce the pressure on the exchange rate over the short to medium term, they are 
unlikely to be sufficient to eliminate it. A rapid buildup of foreign exchange reserves and the 
accumulation of government oil revenue in some kind of external resource fund could mitigate the 
pressure but at the expense of domestic investment, the fiscal position, and private household welfare 
and consumption, as well as poverty reduction. In any case, agriculture and the rural population will 
be discriminated against by the expected oil boom. As net producers of tradable goods and net 
consumers of nontradable goods they suffer twice, from increased production costs and higher prices 
for consumer goods. Only a few select agricultural subsectors that produce exclusively for the 
domestic market, such as root crops, matooke, and horticulture, realize income gains as a result of 
generally higher income and consumption. Transferring part of the oil rent to citizens—rather than to  
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a foreign oil fund—would directly increase household welfare and accelerate poverty reduction 
efforts. Moreover, agriculture as a whole would regain growth momentum. However, the real 
appreciation accompanying the oil-rent-financed expansion of private consumption would induce 
strong structural changes both across and within agricultural subsectors, which might be difficult to 
reverse once oil revenues dry out. Thus, there is the real danger of losing long-run competitiveness 
vis-à-vis foreign suppliers both on world markets for agricultural export commodities as well as on 
domestic markets for food products. 
Second, Uganda’s oil discovery comes at an opportune moment as the country battles with the 
challenges of marked infrastructural backlogs. In this situation of initial scarcity of public 
infrastructure, oil-funded increases in public infrastructure may lead to potentially large medium-term 
welfare gains, despite the presence of Dutch Disease effects. This is particularly true when public 
infrastructure augments the productivity of private factors. Yet, the sectoral and distributional 
consequences of these investments are highly sensitive to the structure and quality of public 
investment spending, which has an influence on the location of productivity effects, as well as the 
characteristics of demand. 
Third, a neutral allocation of investment spending, which leads to a balanced sectoral supply 
response, is broadly beneficial to the Ugandan economy in terms of boosting aggregate growth and 
investment, welfare, and exports while moderating appreciation of the real exchange rate and reducing 
poverty on a significant scale, with rural poverty declining even faster than urban poverty. This relates 
to the Ugandan economy’s ability to produce more goods—both tradable and nontradable—as a result 
of productivity increases, whereas a reversal of the real exchange rate appreciation shifts the domestic 
terms of trade in favor of export-oriented and import-competing agriculture. Thus, even though many 
agricultural subsectors would be indirectly discriminated against if there were no productivity-
enhancing public infrastructure, these sectors are able to expand as a result of productive public 
investment, even when not targeted directly. In contrast, agriculture is hit relatively hard when a 
reallocation of public investment spending leads to a nonagricultural bias in the supply response. 
Fourth, outcomes are markedly different when public investment spending is biased in favor 
of agriculture and food processing. In this case results suggest that (1) the supply response of 
agriculture would be sufficiently strong to more than offset the demand effects of the oil boom; (2) 
agriculture exports would recover more strongly than with a neutral or a nonagricultural, industry-
biased allocation of investment spending; (3) the supply response would generate higher aggregate 
real income gains; and (4) poorer rural households will benefit the most, but without sacrificing urban 
poverty reduction. With respect to the latter, a highly significant outcome is that poverty falls for both 
rural and urban households under an agriculture-biased public investment spending scenario (relative 
to a neutral spending strategy), whereas industry-biased spending would lead to comparably higher 
poverty in both regions. 
Although direct comparisons of scenario results should be done with great caution, a simple 
ranking of public spending options according to growth, real income, and poverty reduction effects 
(Table 5.1) suggests an agriculture-biased investment strategy is the preferred option. Such a strategy 
would not only increase agricultural growth and rural incomes most, but would also have significant 
and positive spillover effects into the rest of the economy, thereby benefiting all segments of society. 
The recommendation is less clear in the zero-spillover scenarios. In this case, there is a trade-off 
between increasing investment (and therefore relatively higher overall growth) and increasing 
consumption (and therefore relatively higher agricultural growth). The latter (increased consumption), 
which is achieved by redistributing oil revenues to Uganda’s citizens via a welfare transfer scheme, is 
associated with larger reductions in poverty, at the national level and particularly in poorer rural areas. 
These conclusions must, of course, be qualified by a number of caveats. Among these is that 
absorption capacity and, consequently, the quality and efficiency of public investments for economic 
growth are critically important. Having oil revenues but then having to incur high economic and 
social costs in attempting to spend these revenues will lower the net benefits of oil. For balanced 
growth and poverty reduction to materialize a well-coordinated set of interventions aimed at 
improving competitiveness in the agricultural sector is needed. These may include investments in  
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agricultural research and development, infrastructure (such as rural roads), and education and skills, 
with priority afforded to those investment areas that have the highest payoffs in terms of agricultural 
productivity gains and increased competitiveness of the sector. Any further analysis of the impact of 
oil in Uganda must pay closer attention to issues of spending efficiency and spending priorities. 
Table 5.1—Ranking of public spending options 











































































Growth                   
GDP  1  3  2    2  1  5  4  3 
Agriculture  3  2  1    2  1  5  3  4 
Household real income                   
All households  2  3  1    2  1  5  4  3 
Rural farm  2  3  1    2  1  5  4  3 
Rural nonfarm  2  3  1    2  1  5  4  3 
Poverty reduction                   
National  2  3  1    2  1  5  4  3 
Rural  2  3  1    2  1  5  4  3 
Source: CGE model results.  
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
Oil Production and Revenue Forecasts 
Estimates on recoverable oil reserves along Uganda’s Albertine Rift vary between 800 and 1,200 
million barrels, given the basin potential of more than 2 billion barrels of oil. Even at conservative 
prices, government oil revenue will be considerable, potentially doubling government revenue and 
constituting an estimated 10–15 percent of GDP at peak production, which is projected to be reached 
within 6–10 years. The CGE simulations in this paper are starting from an optimistic scenario 
developed by the Economic Policy Research Centre (Twimukye and Matovu 2011), which assumes 
reserves of 1,200 million barrels and a 30-year extraction path (Table A.1). Using the current fiscal 
regime and a Brent price assumption of $75 per barrel through the projection period, government oil 
revenue from production sharing and corporate taxes at peak production is estimated to range between 
$2.0 billion to 2.4 billion per year over the peak production period 2017–31. 
For the CGE simulations both the extraction and the government revenue path have been 
adjusted to reflect a more gradual establishment and phasing out of the oil industry, as shown in 
Figure 2.1. More specifically, starting from a low production level of 500 barrels per day in 2007, we 
smoothly increased production by almost 100 percent annually until year 2017, kept production 
constant until year 2025, and decreased it smoothly afterward until year 2046. As mentioned in the 
model description, production is almost exclusively driven by foreign direct investment. Moreover, 
we assumed that annual government revenue is a constant share of the industry’s operating surpluses 
with the government share determined by the average government take over the total extraction path, 
whereas remaining operating surpluses are repatriated to foreign investors. In the model, the 
government take is introduced by a 79 percent factor tax rate on oil capital income. 
Table A.1—Oil production and revenue forecast: 1,200 million barrels reserves at $75/barrel 
Year 
Oil production,  











production sharing,  
$ million 
Investor 








2010  -  -  300.0  -  (300.0)  -  - 
2011  6.0  134.0  458.7  65.0  (389.7)  -  65.0 
2012  15.0  334.0  471.9  179.0  (316.9)  -  179.0 
2013  15.0  334.0  471.9  195.0  (332.9)  -  195.0 
2014  22.5  501.0  782.9  293.0  (574.8)  -  293.0 
2015  30.0  668.0  1,093.8  458.0  (883.8)  -  458.0 
2016  202.5  4,511.0  1,345.7  3,090.0  75.3  -  3,090.0 
2017  210.0  4,678.0  1,078.5  3,204.0  395.5  -  3,204.0 
2018  210.0  4,678.0  478.5  3,204.0  995.5  -  3,204.0 
2019  210.0  4,678.0  478.5  3,204.0  995.5  -  3,204.0 
2020  210.0  4,678.0  478.5  3,204.0  995.5  298.5  3,502.5 
2021  210.0  4,678.0  478.5  3,204.0  995.5  298.5  3,502.5 
2022  210.0  4,678.0  478.5  3,204.0  995.5  298.5  3,502.5 
2023  210.0  4,678.0  328.5  3,204.0  1,145.5  343.5  3,547.5 
2024  210.0  4,678.0  328.5  3,204.0  1,145.5  343.5  3,547.5 
2025  210.0  4,678.0  295.5  3,204.0  1,178.5  353.4  3,557.4 
2026  195.0  4,344.0  248.4  2,975.0  1,120.6  336.0  3,311.0 




Oil production,  






















2028  195.0  4,344.0  175.2  2,975.0  1,193.8  357.9  3,332.9 
2029  195.0  4,344.0  147.2  2,975.0  1,221.9  366.3  3,341.3 
2030  187.5  4,177.0  123.6  2,861.0  1,192.4  357.6  3,218.6 
2031  180.0  4,010.0  133.8  2,747.0  1,129.2  338.8  3,085.8 
2032  165.0  3,675.0  87.3  2,518.0  1,069.7  321.1  2,839.1 
2033  135.0  3,007.0  75.0  2,060.0  872.0  261.7  2,321.7 
2034  120.0  2,673.0  67.5  1,831.0  774.5  232.4  2,063.4 
2035  90.0  2,005.0  67.5  1,373.0  564.5  169.2  1,542.2 
2036  75.0  1,671.0  67.5  1,144.0  459.5  137.6  1,281.6 
2037  67.5  1,504.0  67.5  1,030.0  406.5  121.8  1,151.8 
2038  60.0  1,337.0  67.5  916.0  353.5  106.1  1,022.1 
2039  57.0  1,270.0  67.5  870.0  332.5  99.7  969.7 
2040  52.5  1,169.0  67.5  801.0  300.5  90.3  891.3 
Total     92,458.0  11,019.9  ……..63,167.0  18,271.1  5,580.2  68,747.2 
Average    2,982.5  355.5  ………2,037.6  Z589.4      180.0  2,217.7 
Revenue 
  
           0.21   0.79 
Source: Twimukye and Matovu 2011. 
A Social Accounting Matrix for Uganda 2007 Including Oil Production and Refining 
Crude oil is not currently produced in Uganda, and there is no oil refining capacity in the country. As 
a result, oil production and refining was not included in the original Ugandan social accounting matrix 
(SAM) for 2007. Moreover, information on production costs in crude oil extraction and future 
possible refining activities are not available. We therefore created these new sectors in the SAM and 
model under two assumptions regarding future oil production in Uganda. First, we create negligibly 
small crude oil and refining sectors based on the assumptions that (1) Uganda is producing, refining, 
and exporting 500 barrels per day of oil in 2007, and (2) crude oil extraction and oil refining 
technologies in Uganda will resemble those of the Nigerian oil industry, as shown in Table 3.2. This 
results in a new Micro SAM, which includes the detailed supply and use vectors for these two 
industries and their corresponding outputs. As shown in the extended Macro SAM in Table A.2, the 
oil sector is contributing initially a tiny 0.07 percent share to GDP at factor cost. Second, we introduce 
oil production over the 2007–46 period, reflecting the likely gradual establishment and extraction path 
of the industry. 
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Table A.2—Macro SAM for Uganda 2007 including oil production and refining (billions of Uganda shillings) 










world  Total 
   All 
Crude 
oil  Refining  All 
Crude 




capital              
Activities          33,590                         33,590 
Crude oil             12.92                       12.92 
Refining                 17.62                       17.62 
Commodities  12,272        4,208                 18,743  2,689  5,153  3,697  46,762 
Crude oil       12.92                            12.92 
Refining                                 17.62  17.62 
Other 
commodities     1.00  0.94                                1.94 
Factors  21,317                                      21,317 
Oil labor     0.03  0.04                            0.08 
Oil capital      11.88  3.72                                15.60 
Households                    21,302        12,386  -125        33,563 
Oil labor                     0.08               0.08 
Government          1,704       12.80       694      1,385  3,796 
Inst. Tax                          694         694 
Fac. Tax                       12.79            12.80 
Imp. Tariff          1,044                         1,044 
Com. Tax          660                         660 
Savings and 
investment                          1,741  1,231    2,180  5,152 
Rest of world           7,260        2.81     2.81              7,262 
Total  33,589  12.92  17.62  46,762  12.92  17.62  21,318  0.08  15.60  33,564  3,796  5,153  7,262    
Source: Calculated from 2007 SAM on the assumption that Uganda initially produces about 500 barrels per day of refined oil yielding gross revenue of about $10 million at a price of $75 per 
barrel. 42 
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